





The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in 
the Development Process, with Some Lessons 
from Developed Countries: An Introduction 1 
Giovanni Dosi and Joseph E. Stiglitz 
This book analyzes the impact of diverse intellectual property rights (IPR) 
regimes upon the development process. 
The relationship between IPR and development has become a source of 
increasing concern over the past fifteen years, for two related reasons: (a) it has 
become increasingly recognized that what separates developed from develop-
ing countries is a gap in knowledge, and that inappropriately designed IPR 
regimes can present an important impediment to closing the lmowledge gap, 
and therefore to development; and (b) at the same time, the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Agreements (TRIPS)2 of the Uruguay 
Round imposed a Western-style IPR regime on developing countries, one 
which many developing countries rightly worried might impede their access to 
lmowledge, and thus their development. 
So concerned have many of those in the developing countries become about 
the adverse effects of this intellectual property regime that they have called for 
a "development-oriented intellectual property regime," just as they had, at 
Doha, called for a development-oriented trade regime. On 4 October 2004 the 
General Assembly of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 
decided to advance an IPR agenda that was, for the first time, explicitly 
developmentally oriented. The adoption of the Brazilian and Argentinean 
proposal for a development agenda was a major step forward for several 
reasons. First, it recognized that intellectual property "is not an end in itself"3 
Second, it reiterated WIPO's mission to "promote creative intellectual activity" 
and "the transfer of technology to developing countries." The new develop-
ment agenda calls for ascertaining how different intellectual property regimes 
affect developing countries. This volume can be seen, in part, as providing 
some of the intellectual foundations for that analysis. 
2 Intellectual Property Rights 
Developing conntries have claimed that the IPR regime that the West 
advocates impairs their development not only by failing to give them access 
to knowledge, bnt also by failing to protect their intellectnal property-both 
traditional knowledge and the knowledge embedded in biodiversity. This 
asymmetry too has adverse effects on development, for it necessitates devel-
oping conntries paying large rents to Western firms for their intellectnal 
property, bnt not receiving in retnrn rents from what the developing countries 
view as their intellectual property. Indeed, in some cases, developing countries 
would have to pay Western firms rents for what developing countries view as 
their own property. 
The United States has, for instance, granted patents for traditional know-
ledge (such as traditional medicinal uses of certain plants), which developing 
countries argue should not be patentable. Traditionally, this type of knowledge 
was held by commnnities and made freely available. Developing countries 
have widely criticized the patents on neem oil, basmati rice, and the medicinal 
uses of turmeric.4 But the United States has not even ratified the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, nnder pressure from the pharmaceutical companies 
that fear it would provide (what they consider to be) "excessive" protection for 
the intellectual property associated with the use in their products of genetic 
material derived from plants or animals in, say, developing countries-even if 
the countries from which they had taken the plant or animal had devoted 
considerable resonrces to preserving their biodiversity. Evidently, in this line 
of argument, while incentives are important for the pharmaceutical compa-
nies, they are not for countries; and while companies should be rewarded 
for "discovery," countries should not be rewarded for protecting their 
biodiversity-without which the discovery would not have been possible. 
The one point of intellectual consistency in the position of the United States 
is that it seeks an IPR regime that maximizes the rents for its companies and 
minimizes the rents that its companies might pay to others. 
Developed conntries have tried to argue that "strong" IPR (in which 
traditional medicine can be patented, but genetic material that developing 
countries believe is theirs is left unprotected5) is in the best interests of 
developing countries. The papers in this book, and the discussion below, 
suggest such contentions are incorrect. 
Indeed, the IPR regime that the United States has pushed on the world was 
not the one its scientists and innovators advocated. It was the IPR regime that 
the drug and entertainment industries advocated. One of us (Stiglitz) had the 
opportunity to see this first hand:6 
When I served on President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers, we pro-
vided our assessment of the TRIPS agreement, the intellectual property provi-
sions of the 1994 WTO Uruguay Round agreement, which sought to impose an 
American style intellectual property regime on developing countries. Both we and 
Intel! 
the Office of Sc 
opposed TRIPS 
and the econorr 
own innovative 
maximize inno' 
a patent (and tl 
Along with man 
there is a need fo 
impose such a fl 
reforming its re: 
regime that eve1 
American IPR 1 
developing conn 
United States, th 
Among the ce 
















(ii) In genera 
are not"' 
(iii) Most brc 
biguous' 











































)th we and 
Intellectual Property Rights in the Development Process 
the Office of Science and Technology Policy within the White House basically 
opposed TRIPS, believing that it was bad for American science, global science, 
and the economies of the U.S. and developing countries alike. Many of America's 
ovm innovative firms are trying to change its IPR regime, which is designed not to 
maximize innovation but rents from those who have had the good luck receiving 
a patent (and the two are not the same). 
3 
Along with many of the authors of the papers in this volume, we believe that 
there is a need for reform in the U.S. IPR regin1e and that it would be wrong to 
in1pose such a flawed regin1e on others. (Indeed, the United States has been 
reforming its regime;7 there is a worry that others will be left with an IPR 
regin1e that even the United States has rejected.) As badly designed as the 
American IPR regin1e is for the United States, it is even worse suited for 
developing countries. But even if the American IPR regin1e were ideal for the 
United States, that does not mean that it would be ideal for others. 
Among the central theses of this introduction, and the papers in this book, 
are the following: 
(i) Intellectual property is man-made; it is a social contrivance purport-
edly designed to increase welfare, by supposedly enhancing innovation 
(though, as we shall see, it may actually have exactly the opposite 
effect). Moreover, the focus on intellectual property rights ignores the 
fact that all property rights come with restrictions; they are never 
unfettered (Kennedy and Stiglitz, 2013). In the case of intellectual 
property rights, there are restrictions associated both with abuses-
they cannot (or should not) be used to unduly restrict competition-
and also with public uses-compulsory licenses can and have played 
an important role in ensuring access to knowledge when it is deemed 
central for the public interest. Part of the granting of a patent is full 
disclosure of relevant information, so that others can build upon the 
lmowledge. Different countries may come to different judgments 
about which abuses are unacceptable or which public interests are 
essential. 
(ii) In general, the private returns to innovation with intellectual property 
are not well-aligned with social returns.8 
(iii) Most broadly, the link between stronger IPR and innovation is am-
biguous at best.9 
(iv) The impact of IPR on welfare and innovation depends on details of the 
IPR regin1e and the nature of the sector-institutional details matter. 
Advocates of IPR in advanced industrial countries have not only 
focused excessively on IPR. They have also typically argued that the 
better and stronger intellectual property rights are, the more innova-
tive the economy will be.10 We show, to the contrary, that there is 
4 Intellectual Property Rights 
considerable subtlety in the design of a good IPR regime. In the 
discussion below, we will explain that there are many details in the 
design of an intellectual property regime that affect the extent to 
which it promotes or impedes innovation. It is not just a question of 
"strong" or "weak'' intellectual property rights. Rather, the design of 
the whole intellectual property regime, with its myriad of provisions, 
is what matters." 
(v) Poorly designed IPR systems may not enhance welfare, both in the 
short run and in the long; and such systems may well impede 
innovation. We will explain that the IPR regime in the United States, 
and which the United States has attempted to foist on developing 
countries, may actually be welfare reducing. Both the levels and 
patterns of innovation may be adversely affected. Interestingly, as 
we have noted, even many in the United States high-tech sectors have 
come to recognize this, and there have been marked changes in the 
IPR regime in recent years. Not all have been positive, but even the 
positive ones have not yet been incorporated into other countries' 
IPR regimes. 
(vi) Intellectual property is only one way of incentivizing innovative 
research; it is only one part of what might be thought of as a country's 
innovation system, the collection of institutions that promote innov-
ation; there has been too much emphasis on IPR, to the exclusion of 
other ways of stimulating innovation and learning. 
(vii) An intellectual property regime that might be appropriate for one 
country or one sector might be inappropriate for another. 
(viii) In particular, the IPR regimes of the advanced developed countries 
are likely to be inappropriate for many developing countries, and this 
is likely to be especially so in areas like health and agriculture. One 
reason that an IPR regime designed for advanced developed coun-
tries may be inappropriate for developing countries is that institu-
tional transplants generally don't work. Indeed, one-size-fits-all 
policy prescriptions are rarely a good idea in any field, 12 but this 
is one area where they may work particularly badly. Institutional 
structures have to be sensitive to differences in objectives and 
circumstances-including the broader set of institutional arrange-
ments, which inevitably differ from country to country, shaped by 
circumstances and history. There are, for instance, large distribution-
al consequences of different IPR regimes, and developing countries 
may not have the resources to easily offset those effects. Moreover, 
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Intellectual Property Rights in the Development Process 5 
institutions. The excessive focus on IPR-a market-based approach 
to promoting innovation-ignores the effects on and interactions 
with these other parts of countries' innovation systems. 
The implications of this analysis can be summarized briefly: Intellectual 
property rights-like other institutions-are social constructions whose ob-
jective is to promote the well-being of society. In the case of intellectual 
property rights, well-designed intellectual property regimes attempt to do 
this through the expansion and deepening of its knowledge base. But all 
institutions (including intellectual property rights) need to be adapted to the 
circumstances, history, and objectives of each country. In many circum-
stances, intellectual property rights may not be the best way of promoting 
innovation. Developing countries need to design their own IPR regimes, 
appropriate to their economies and circumstances. 
As we noted, a country's IPR system does not exist in isolation; it is part of 
the country's innovation system. And the innovation system does not exist in 
isolation. It can, for instance, affect the competitiveness and efficiency of the 
entire economy, the extent of inequality in society, and the health of its 
citizens. It can even have large budgetary consequences, as in the United 
States, where the government pays pharmaceutical companies large amounts 
for drugs, the production costs of which are but a fraction of what the 
government pays-in some cases, even for drugs largely based on govern-
ment-financed research. The United States may be able to afford such largesse 
(though that is increasingly being questioned). For developing countries, the 
opportunity cost of these expenditures is enormous-the money could have 
been better spent promoting education or innovation-and there are even 
better ways to spend the government's health budget. 
The discussions in this book will hopefully point the way to a developmen-
tally oriented intellectual property reginle. 
The discussion of this chapter is divided into six parts. The first presents the 
general theory of innovation, in the context of which we can evaluate the 
consequences of stronger IPR. The second employs this general theory to 
make some critical observations of the role of IPR in promoting innovation. 
The third discusses some of the evidence on the role of IPR in promoting 
innovation, looking particularly at the empirical evidence on the relationship 
between patents, appropriability, and innovation. The fourth presents the 
central elements of what we may call the "portfolio approach to an effective 
innovation system." The fifth focuses on the special problems of developing 
countries engaged in late industrialization and catching-up. We conclude 
with a brief discussion of some recent developments in intellectual property 
reginles that shed light on the issues raised here. 
6 Intellectual Property Rights 
I. THE GENERAL THEORY OF INNOVATION 
AND THE ROLE OF IPR 
That profit-motivated innovators are fundamental drivers of the "unbound 
Prometheus" of modern capitalism (Landes, 1969) has been well appreciated 
since Smith, Marx, and later, Schum peter. And the last half a century has also 
seen in-depth analyses of determinants of the pace of technological progress 
and entrepreneurs' and business firms' propensity to innovate (for a thorough 
survey, see Dosi and Nelson, 2010). 
There are many sources of innovation. Some come from outside the 
industry such as the advances in applied science, generally stemming from 
public laboratories and universities. However, at least equally important in a 
modern economy are the activities of search, including of course research and 
development expenditures, undertaken by business firms-explicit invest-
ments in developing new products that consumers and firms value, or new 
processes that reduce the costs of production. But if firms are to make these 
investments, they have to reap a return. If they appropriate for themselves less 
than the full social return to their innovation (and if firms were able ex ante to 
make accurate predictions on actual costs and returns), then there might be 
private underinvestment in innovation. The intent of the patent (IPR) system 
is to enable individuals and firms to garner for themselves a larger fraction of 
the social returns resulting from their innovative activity. 13 
But there are circumstances in which, especially under a strong patent 
system, the returns they reap can actually be in excess of the marginal social 
product. The marginal social product is related to the fact that the innovation 
is available earlier than it otherwise would have been. A firm's contribution 
can be negligible, and yet its rewards large. Moreover, an innovation may 
garner for a firm high profits in an imperfectly competitive industry, by seizing 
a fraction of its rivals' profits with a me-too innovation. These are not just 
theoretical niceties: me-too innovations abound in the pharmaceutical indus-
try. So do attempts to appropriate advances in scientific knowledge: a good 
example is the medical diagnostic company Myriad, which rushed to beat the 
human genome project in identifying the BRCA genes related to breast cancer, 
so that it could get patents from which it could extract large rents from any 
woman wanting to find out whether she had a high risk of getting cancer. In 
that case, the net social return was negative, for the patents allowed the 
company to charge a high fee, well beyond the ability of anyone who is poor 
without insurance to pay. After years of legal wrangling, the Supreme Court 
finally struck down Myriad's patents on human genes in June 2013. However, 
this did not happen before many women were forced to make agonizing 
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Intellectual Property Rights in the Development Process 7 
incomplete information, either because they could not afford the tests or 
because the patents prevented second opinions. 14 
Sometimes knowledge is produced as a by-product of production and 
investment. In that case, there may be little need to provide incentives;15 but 
a patent can reduce access by others to the benefits of the knowledge so 
produced. Again, iu that case, patents can have a negative social iulpact. 
Later in this introduction, we will eJ'}Jlain other ways in which the patent 
system may impede innovation. 
Knowledge as a (quasi-) public good 
Any analysis of iunovation and the patent system begius with the question, 
how is the production of knowledge different from that of ordinary goods? ln 
the case of ordinary goods, there is a presumption that markets are efficient, 
and there is little controversy about the definition of "property rights." In the 
case of the production of knowledge, there is, as we have just seen, no 
presumption that private production, with or without "iutellectual property 
rights," is efficient. 
The fundamental problem with knowledge, it has come to be recognized, is 
that it is a quasi-public good (it is often hard to exclude others from the 
knowledge a person or corporation acquired, 16 and even if it were possible, it is 
inefficient to do so, since one person's access to knowledge does not detract 
from the knowledge of others).17 But unlike other public goods where we rely 
on government provision, we turn to the private sector for both production 
and financing of much innovation. The challenge has been how to get private 
markets to provide the desirable level and form of such a public good. Efficient 
competitive markets might be unable to generate a stream of quasi-rents 
sufficient to motivate profit-seeking firms to invest resources in the produc-
tion of such goods (Arrow 1962a). A long line of economists (from Smith to 
Marx to Schumpeter (1943)) argued that in order to provide such incentives, it 
was necessary to depart from pure competition. 18 
Granted that, however, what is empirically the extent of such a departure, 
and what are the consequences? Clearly, if there is to be private provision of 
research, those engaging in research have to be able to appropriate some 
returns. But any such appropriation necessitates an iulpediulent to the effi-
cient utilization of knowledge. Heller (1998) and Heller and Eisenberg (1998) 
have referred to the underutilization of knowledge as a result of patents as the 
"tragedy of the anti-commons." The tragedy of the commons was the (alleged) 
iuability, without property rights, to exclude individuals from the use of the 
commons, leading to over-utilization, e.g. overgrazing. The tragedy of the anti-
commons is that knowledge, for which utilization is non-rivalrous, is restricted. 
Those that argued that property rights were essential for preventing the 
8 Intellectual Property Rights 
tragedy of the commons were wrong; regulatory mechanisms can be just as 
effective, without the adverse distributive consequences (see e.g. Ostrom, 
Gardner, and Walker, 1994.) So too we argue here that property rights are 
not always the best solution to the appropriability problem. 
This raises the question, what is the "desirable" degree of appropriability1 
And through which mechanisms? 
Appropriability occurs through patent and copyright protection, but there 
are alternative, perhaps more important, mechanisms. Because of lead times 
and the costs and time required for duplication and learning, and because of 
the availability of specific manufacturing facilities and sales networks, the first 
innovator can typically appropriate some returns to his innovation, even 
without IPR; secrecy and the fact that much relevant knowledge is "tacit" 
can enhance the ability of firms to appropriate returns on their investments in 
knowledge (these mechanisms of appropriation are discussed at length in Dosi 
and Nelson, 2010). 
The choice of the appropriability mechanism may be largely dictated by the 
nature of technology, with some industries relying on trade secrets, lead times, 
and the sheer complexity of products, rather than IPR. 19 The diversity mech-
anisms through which firms benefit from innovation, however, has been lost 
in a good deal of contemporary literature on innovation, in which it seems to 
be assumed that the only way by which appropriability occurs is through IPR. 
In fact, there seems to be no compelling evidence of a positive relation, 
above some threshold, between appropriability in general-and even more so, 
the tightening of IPR regimes-on the one hand, and the rates of innovation, 
on the other. The discussion below will explain why this empirical result 
should not come as a surprise. 
While the evidence that IPR in general promotes innovation is far from 
convincing, there is good evidence that there may be adverse effects, especially 
with poorly designed "tight" IPR regimes: access to life-saving medicines may 
be restricted and so too access to knowledge that is necessary for successful 
development, and even for follow-on innovation. As governments have to 
spend more money to purchase the drugs they need, because of reduced 
availability of low-cost generic medicines, other expenditures-from those 
necessary to promote growth to those devoted to alleviating poverty-are 
reduced. Conversely, there may be perverse links between IPR protection 
and income distribution. Moreover, even if an IPR regime promoted growth 
in, say, some sector in some industrial country, it does not mean it will do so in 
other sectors and/or in other countries. 
Some failures of the "market failure" arguments 
We begin by considering the main arguments supporting IPR, then turn to 
why the traditional analyses fail to provide an adequate description of the 
innovation I 
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Intellectual Property Rights in the Development Process 9 
innovation process-and thereby why they fail to provide a persuasive analysis 
of the role of IPR in supporting the innovation process. 
The economic foundations of the theory supporting IPR rest upon a 
standard market failure argument: Markets perfectly fulfil their allocative 
role only in the absence of externalities. Without full appropriability, there 
will be, as we have noted, positive externalities to research, and this in turn 
leads to underinvestment and underproduction of knowledge. There is a 
(partial) market-based solution: even though knowledge is "non-rivalrous" 
one can attempt to mal<e it partially excludable, e.g. through patents. This will 
mean that more of the benefits of the knowledge will be appropriated by those 
who invest in knowledge. 
But it also means that, because of the artificial scarcity, the knowledge 
that has been produced is not being used efficiently. This tension between 
purported incentives for the crdtion of knowledge and its efficient utilization 
is a theme that plays out throughout most analyses of the appropriate design 
of!PR. 
As this volume illustrates, matters are even worse: granting exclusivity to 
the use of knowledge is tantamount to granting a (limited) monopoly; but 
sometimes the monopoly power thus granted is leveraged further to create 
market power in segments of the economy. Sometimes, at great exrense, 
governments have acted to curb some of the abuses of this market power (as 
in the case of Microsoft), but even after taking actions to limit anticompetitive 
practices, monopoly power persists. Not only does this result in a distorted, 
less efficient economy, but, as we shall comment later, even innovation may be 
hurt-ironic, since the putative purpose of IPR is to promote innovation. 
The core of the design of a good IPR regime then becomes (a) balancing out 
the detrimental effect of the deadweight loss implied by a legally enforced 
monopoly, on the one hand, and the beneficial effect of investments in R&D 
and more generally in knowledge generation, on the other; and (b) detailed 
provisions which limit the adverse static costs and maximize the dynamic 
benefits. Of course, ifIPR actually impedes innovation, then there is no trade-
off: the economy loses in the short run and the long. Unfortunately, it appears 
that too often the dynamic consequences are at best mixed-some forms of 
innovation are helped, others are hurt. Well-designed IPR regimes are those 
that minimize both the short-run allocative costs, the long-run dynamic 
impediments to innovation, and the incentives for rent-seeking innovations 
which have minimal positive, or even negative, effects on welfare, while 
enhancing the positive incentives for welfare-enhancing innovations. 
But IPR regimes can only go so far: IPR more broadly needs to be seen as 
part of a country's innovation system (Stiglitz, 2012; Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 
2010; Nelson, 1993, 2004a, 2004b, 2006); and the design of a good innovation 
system consists oflooking for ways of enhancing simultaneously dynamic and 
10 Intellectual Property Rights 
static efficiency~a high level of knowledge generation combined with a 
system of efficient utilization of knowledge. 
Patents and monopolization 
Advocates of strong IPR discount the adverse effects of monopolization, 
thinking that monopolies would be short-lived, since the force of "Schumpe-
terian competition" would lead one monopolist to be replaced by another. 
Schumpeter and quite a few after him thought there would be competition for 
the market, rather than competition in the market, and that competition for 
the market would be sufficiently keen that consumers would reap large 
benefits. Schumpeter and many of his followers touted the advantages that 
arise from the greater level of innovation, arguing that they more than 
outweighed the distortions associated with monopoly. 
But research over tbe past three decades has shown that all of these 
contentions are questionable. Monopolists have the ability and incentives to 
deter others from entering, so that monopolies can persist (see, e.g. Dasgupta 
and Stiglitz, 1980 and Gilbert and Newbery, 1982). 
While Arrow (1962a) suggested that monopolies have far weaker incentives 
to innovate (compared to the social optimum), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), 
Stiglitz (1988), and Fudenberg et al. (1983) have shown that matters are far 
worse than Arrow thought: a monopolist can maintain his position simply by 
getting a little bit ahead of his rivals, enough ahead that the rivals know that 
should they enter the fray, he will outcompete them. Worse still, recent years 
have seen monopolists using their monopoly power to squelch innovators who 
represent a threat to their dominant position; and the knowledge that they 
have the incentive, resources, and tools to do so provides a disincentive to 
innovation. Microsoft has provided the example par excellence of this behav-
iour. Integrating Internet Explorer into its operating system meant providing 
the browser at an essentially zero price, malting it impossible for the market 
innovator in browsers, Netscape, to compete. Even though Microsoft was 
charged with anticompetitive practices in Europe, America, and Asia, and 
agreed to discontinue these practices, Netscape never recovered. 
Patents, access to knowledge, and innovation 
There are other reasons that IPR may be bad for innovation: one of the most 
important inputs into research is knowledge, and IPR reduces access to 
knowledge. 20 
Matters might not be so bad in .a world with perfect information, in which 
the owner of the patent could act as a perfectly discriminating monopolist, 
charging each potential user a price which extracts the maximum rents 
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Intellectual Property Rights in the Development Process 11 
and restrictions in access to knowledge do impede follow-on innovation. More 
rents to earlier innovators result in less to follow-on innovators, thus reducing 
their incentives to innovate. 
Who has access to information and knowledge today may affect who can 
engage in research. Reduced access to knowledge can, as we noted, lead to 
reduced possibilities to invest in research and to reduced innovation. The 
U.S. patent system recognized this, requiring wide disclosure as a quid pro quo 
for granting a patent. But the disclosure requirements may not suffice to offset 
the adverse effects from the "enclosure of the commons." And worse, some 
who are the most ardent defenders of patent rights are fighting against such 
disclosures, and in practice, disclosure has been far from complete.
21 
Patent thicket 
Matters have become even worse with the development of what is called the 
patent thicket, an overlay of intellectual property claims that makes progress 
difficult, at best.22 With thousands of patents being issued every year, in some 
areas (including many high-tech ones) it is hard to avoid trespassing on 
someone else's patent, and expensive and time consuming to engage in the 
research (reviewing patents that have been granted) that might avoid this. 
Modern complex products involve a myriad of components, many of which 
may be essential to the success of the product; and even if not essential, it may 
be very expensive to innovate around the patent.23 
Such a patent thicket slowed the development of the airplane in the years 
before World War I, and it was only strong government action to override 
these claims by the creation of a patent pool that allowed the development of 
the airplane that was so central to that war (see Stiglitz, 2008; Bradshaw, 1992). 
More recently, a whole industry has developed-firms that buy up patents, 
waiting until someone successfully produces a product that might have in-
fringed on their patent, to sue, "holding them up", in effect, for ransom.
24 
To 
the extent that they can get more for themselves, there is less left over for the 
"real innovators." 
The consequences of such holdups are particularly important in those 
industries where successful innovation requires putting together various 
pieces of distributed knowledge. But even without holdups, the IP system 
may impede innovation. The IP regime gives too many subjects the right to 
exclude others from using fragmented and overlapping pieces of knowledge, 
with the result that no one can make effective use of them (Heller and 
Eisenberg, 1998 and Heller, 1998). One by-product of the recent surge in 
patenting is that, in several domains, knowledge has been so finely subdivided 
into separate but complementary property claims that the cost of reassembling 
constituent parts/properties in order to engage in further research imposes a 
12 Intellectual Property Rights 
heavy burden on technological advance. This means that a large number of 
costly negotiations might be needed in order to secure critical licenses, dis-
couraging the pursuit of certain classes of research projects. Not surprisingly, 
at the beginning of this century, Barton (2000) noted that "the number of 
intellectual property lawyers is growing faster than the amount of research." 
Since then, matters have become worse. In these circumstances, the prolifer-
ation of patents may well turn out to have the effect of discouraging 
innovation. 
Other distortions in the allocation of R&D 
Holdup patents are but one example of socially unproductive "innovation" or 
innovations where social returns are markedly lower than private returns. The 
Myriad patent race, described earlier, provides another. But there are still 
others, including me-too patents-in which an innovator tries to grab part of 
the rents of existing patent holders; and innovation designed to extend the life 
of the patent, or more generally, to enhance the patent holder's monopoly 
returns. Some of the research (in some fields, perhaps much) is directed at 
getting around an existing patent, i.e. to avoid unreasonable charges for the 
use of a patent.25 Much of the patenting is defensive-to protect oneself 
against a claim of someone else. Huge amounts are spent on patent lawyers.26 
Thus, while the advocates of a strong patent system champion its ability to 
increase the allocation of resources into innovation, critics (rightly, in our 
view) point out the distortionary effects, both in the short run and the long, 
with the result that not only may patents interfere with the efficient use of 
information today, but a poorly designed patent system may not even lead to a 
faster pace of innovation. Thus, even the classic distinction between "static" 
and "dynamic" efficiency may be misplaced. 
More generally, rules affecting access to knowledge affect the patterns of 
technological evolution in directions which are, in general, far from optimal. 
Later in this introduction, we shall discuss how reforms in the patent system 
can mitigate some of the adverse effects of currently dominant IPR regimes. 
The multiple drivers of the innovation process 
Much of the early theoretical literature on the design of IPR was overly 
simplistic. It failed to take into account key aspects of the production of 
knowledge, the variety of ways by which the returns to innovation are appro-
priated, and the many problematic aspects of the IPR regimes. As we have 
previously commented, for instance, the most important input into the 
production of knowledge is knowledge itself, and any product in today's 



























they are a 












and that c 
institutes, 











e are still 
·ab part of 
nd the life 
monopoly 
iirected at 
ges for the 
eel oneself 
1 26 : awyers. 
:s ability to 
Ltly, in our 
d the long, 
:ient use of 






. was overly 
roduction of 
in are appro-
As we have 
put into the 
ct in today's 
mplementary 
Intellectual Property Rights in the Development Process 13 
innovations.27 This means that innovation cannot be viewed from the per-
spective of a one-off event. Each innovation builds on prior innovations, and 
works in conjunction with other innovations. It is difficult, if not impossible, 
to identify the productivity of one innovation in isolation from others (they 
are "joint" inputs).28 
Part of the deficiencies in the standard theory arise from treating lmowledge 
much like any other form of capital and property, ignoring the many subtleties 
and complexities. For instance, while the boundaries of real estate property are 
easy to establish, those of intellectual property are not. Each idea builds on 
others. Intellectual property was intended to encourage new ideas, but how do 
we define "novelty"? What ideas are the obvious consequence of previous 
ideas, and therefore should not be patentable? 
Moreover, as we already mentioned, while many aspects of knowledge can 
be viewed as a "public good," for which exclusion exists only as a result of 
government actions through the enforcement of intellectual property rights, in 
fact there are many non-public aspects of knowledge-tacit knowledge that 
may in fact be hard to transfer, and the returns to which are easy to appro-
priate without IPR. In some sectors, trade secrets play a far more important 
role than IPR, and in most sectors, they and other returns associated with 
being the first entrant into a market play a major role. 
Indeed, there are marked differences in the nature of "knowledge" and its 
production in different industries. In some cases, it is primarily tacit know-
ledge, which arises as a by-product of production and investment.29 In the 
chemical industry, identifying compounds and their effects is critical, but so 
are the processes by which the chemicals are synthesized. In some countries, in 
some periods, naturally existing compounds could not be patented-after all, 
they are a fact of nature, not a creation of man. Only the production processes 
could be patented. Analogous debates are now playing out in biotechnology: 
some jurisdictions have ruled that genes can be patented, others that they 
cannot.30 
More generally, to transform information into "useful knowledge" requires 
a lot of search and development activities, partially based on pre-existing 
lmowledge, processes which are to a large extent tacit and embedded in 
organizations. Such processes through which new knowledge is generated 
are strongly dependent on the specificities of each technological paradigm 
(More in Dosi, 1982, and Dosi and Nelson, 2010). 
The standard theory suffers from another deficiency. It focuses on the 
private production of knowledge, not taking into account the important 
interactions between the production of knowledge by profit-seeking firms 
and that of other actors in the economy (governments, not-for-profit research 
institutes, universities). But private production of applied knowledge typically 
rests on a foundation of basic research provided by these other institutions. 
Moreover, the level and direction of research is affected by a whole variety of 
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motivations and instrnments, besides that of property rights stressed in the 
IPR literature. Viewing markets as embedded in and depending upon a whole 
ensemble of non-market institutions allows us to appreciate the fact that 
technological innovation is highly dependent on a variety of complementary 
institutions (e.g. public agencies, public policies, universities, professional 
communities and, of course, corporate organizations with their rich inner 
strncture) which can hardly be called "markets" and, at best, are governed and 
regulated by pure market incentives only to a limited extent.31 This institu-
tional embeddedness of innovative activities makes it very unlikely that a 
"market failure" approach such as the one we sketched above could provide 
a fully satisfactory account of the relationship between appropriability and 
propensity to innovate. 
In short, one needs to see IPR as part of a country's innovation system, in 
which there are many institutions involved in the innovation process and in 
which there are a variety of mechanisms by which research is financed and 
funded and by which those engaging in research can be motivated and 
appropriate returns. Indeed, in some of these institutional settings ( univer-
sities, for example) motivations are unrelated to standard concerns about 
appropriability, and enhanced appropriability has almost surely unambigu-
ously adverse effects on innovation. 32 This reinforces the earlier conclusion 
that there may not only be adverse static consequences from stronger IPR but 
adverse dynamic effects. 
Both static and dynamic efficiency are affected by this broader range of 
instruments; and it is accordingly wrong to focus simply on market-based 
"tools," and among the potential market based instrnments, to focus just on 
intellectual property rights. (See section III on alternative ways to promote 
innovation.) 
While IPR is part-but only a part-of a country's innovation system, data 
presented below shows that intellectual property rights play a different role 
in different industries. In some industries, where follow-on (sequential) 
innovations are important and/or where successful projects require large 
numbers of complementary "ideas" and components IPR (and especially 
poorly designed IPR regimes) can have an especially adverse effect on 
innovation. 
II. SOME THEORETICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL 
ASPECTS OF IPR AND INNOVATION 
What we have said so far should have made dear that the conventional 
wisdom, that the stronger the intellectual property regime, the better-the 
higher the level of innovation-is wrong. In fact, there has long been doubt 
Int 
about the role 
IPR on innova 
"reforms" in tl 
H 
Scepticism ab1 
century ago, a 
"If we did not 
our present kr 
ing one. But s 
irresponsible, ( 
it" (1958: 80). 
that IPR is n< 
institutional r 
efficiently. 
It is worth 1 
costs of IPR, c 
by special int 
remarked earl 






especially in t 
science and in 
The same cri" 
current IPR re 
systems could 
have indeed h< 
States in recen 
discussion of 1 
breadth of the 
granted, and tl 
all of the chani 
ssed in the 
'on a whole 






kely that a 
llld provide 
iability and 
1 system, in 








.er range of 
arket-based 












Intellectual Property Rights in the Development Process 15 
about the role of IPR in promoting innovation. To some extent, the effect of 
IPR on innovation depends on the design of the IPR regime. And some of the 
"reforms" in the IPR regime in recent years may have made matters worse. 
Historical scepticism about the role of patents 
Scepticism about the role of intellectual property rights is not new. A half 
century ago, as Fritz Machlup, whose research focused on knowledge, put it: 
"If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of 
our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend institut-
ing one. But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be 
irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing 
it" (1958: 80). Similar doubts are expressed in David (1993, 2002) who argues 
that IPR is not necessary for new technologies and suggests that different 
institutional mechanisms more similar to open science might work more 
efficiently. 
It is worth noting that as different countries have debated the benefits and 
costs of!PR, over time, there have been marked changes-largely influenced 
by special interests, but also sometimes influenced by public policy. We 
remarked earlier that at some times, in some countries, chemical entities 
could not be patented, and patents were only granted for the processes 
through which the entities could be synthesized. Through all of these changes, 
though, much of basic research-such as mathematical concepts-were not 
patentable. There is a broad consensus that the costs of extending patents 
would exceed the benefits. The worry, however, is that, under the influence of 
corporate interests, the boundaries of what is patentable have been extended, 
especially in the United States, in ways that are adverse to the advances of 
science and innovation. 
Details matter: the challenge of designing 
a pro-innovation IPR system 
The same criticism can be levelled against many other provisions of the 
current IPR regime. While some of the observed problems with current patent 
systems could be obviated with a better designed system, some of them may 
have indeed been made worse with changes in the patent system in the United 
States in recent years. Details matter. For instance, while there has been much 
discussion of the length of the patent, equally important are questions of the 
breadth of the patent, the standards of novelty under which a patent can be 
granted, and the processes by which patents can be granted (or opposed). (Not 
all of the changes have been bad. Later, we will note at least one instance where 
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a Court decision has reduced the scope for enforcement actions for holdup 
patents, which can be adverse for innovation.) 
Because the boundaries of knowledge and thus also of intellectual property 
are fuzzy, excessively broad patent protection can be especially adverse to 
innovation. 33 Ford had to challenge a broad patent that had been granted on 
self-propelled vehicles to produce his low cost "people's" car. A broad patent 
in genetically modified organisms (the "OncoMouse") has suppressed research 
and innovation in the field ofcancer (see Murray et al., 2011). Patents can easily 
embrace existing knowledge, rewarding the patent holder well beyond his 
contribution. But in "fencing in the commons" access of others to incumbent 
knowledge and the returns that others will reap from their true contributions 
are reduced, again diminishing future innovation (see Boyle, 2003). 
The asymmetries in getting and challenging patents worsen the problem: 
getting a patent privatizes what might have been public knowledge. Success-
fully challenging a patent converts what would have been a private good into 
the public domain. It is providing a public good, and, as in the case of other 
public goods, there will be an underprovision. That is why it is important to 
lower the costs of challenging the issuance of patents. European intellectual 
property framework is, in this respect, somewhat better than that of the United 
States (see Henry and Stiglitz, 2010). 
These problems become more severe the lower the standard of "novelty" 
that is imposed in granting a patent. Several U.S. patents have been rightly 
criticized: Amazon's "one click" for buying online, or Apple's claim on 
rectangular smartphones and tablets with rounded corners are good cases to 
the point. 
Making things worse: the expansion of the IPR 
domain to scientific exploration and public-funded search34 
The last thirty years not only witnessed a tightening of the IPR regime in most 
developed countries, but brought about also (a) a significant shrinkage of the 
legal domains of the commons of open source; (b) a related (but not fully 
overlapping) extension of the domain of matters considered patentable; and 
(c) a significant extension of the depth and breadth of patents themselves. 
The first regime change, in shorthand, goes under the heading of the Bayh-
Dole (BD) Act, encouraging American universities to patent results obtained 
with public funding and sell them under exclusive terms to private profit-
making actors. The issue is discussed at much greater detail by So et al. in 
Chapter 6 of this volume. 
Bayh-Dole was a fundamental change in the premises underlying research 
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curiosity and the quest for knowledge drove research. Peer recognition, not 
monetary rewards, provided any additional incentives if required.35 
Of course, the commodification of scientific inquiry stemming from Bayh-
Dole has little to do with the incentives for research provided to the scientists 
actually doing the research. Their research is financed ex ante by taxpayers, 
universities, and research institutions.36 The purported aim is an easier com-
mercialization of its results. As we discuss below and in Chapter 6, there is 
little evidence of the latter, but a growing evidence on the distortion in the 
directions of scientific search linked with deep transformations in the institu-
tional mission of research universities. 
Of particular concern, as David (2004a and 2004b) convincingly argues, 
"open science" is a relatively fragile institutional arrangement. The Bayh-Dole 
"philosophy" may turn out to be a serious blow to open science. And because 
of "path dependence," once open science is undermined, it may be hard to 
restore. Indeed, as Chan, Sulston, and Harris argue (Chapter 5 in this volume) 
the domain of open science is consistent with ethical motivations supporting 
the value of knowledge and discovery per se, which commodification excludes. 
They argue that if there are rights to intellectual property, they have to 
compete with other (higher) rights of an ethical and moral kind. (These issues 
become especially relevant when IPR encroaches on access to medicines and 
to knowledge relevant to global warming-where overzealous enforcement of 
IPR can adversely affect the right to life, or even the survival of the planet.) 
There have been other extensions of the domain of patentability that may 
have adversely affected innovation: the patentability of research tools and with 
that also the downstream restriction on research and on the ability of multiple 
researchers to draw upon each other's knowledge, building on common 
platforms and investments (Maskus, 1997). 
This is particularly the case with patents on inventions concerning funda-
mental pieces of knowledge. Good examples are patents on genes or the Leder 
and Stewart patent on a genetically engineered mouse that develops cancer. To 
the extent that such techniques and knowledge are critical for further research 
that proceeds cumulatively on the basis of the original invention, the attribu-
tion of broad property rights might severely hamper further developments. 
Even more so if the patent protects not only the product the inventors have 
achieved (the "OncoMouse") but all the class of products that could be 
produced through that principle ("all transgenic non-human mammals") or 
all the possible uses of a patented invention (say, a gene sequence), even 
though they are not named in the application. In this respect, Murray et al. 
(2011) offers a striking illustration of how "opening up upstream" research 
paths can yield more search and more diverse explorations of "downstream" 
research paths. 
Historical examples, such as those discussed by Merges and Nelson (1994) 
of the Selden patent of a four-wheel self-propelled vehicle (the automobile) 
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and the Wright brothers' patent on an efficient stabilizing and steering system 
for flying machines illustrate how the IPR regime probably considerably 
retarded the subsequent development of automobiles and aircrafts. Earlier, 
at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, the breadth of Watt's patent 
hindered innovation in high pressure steam engines (Nuvolari, 2004). The 
current debate on property rights in biotechnology suggests similar problems, 
where granting very broad claims on patents may have a detrimental effect on 
the rate of innovation, insofar as they preclude the exploration of alternative 
applications of the patented invention. 
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
The ambiguous relation between appropriability (and even more so, IPR 
forms of appropriability) and rates of innovation puts the burden of proof 
upon the actual empirical record. 
Indeed, the past two decades have witnessed the broadening of the patent-
ing domain, including into areas that previously could not be so protected. 
This has been associated with an unprecedented increase in patenting rates. 
Between 1988 and 2000, patent applications from U.S. corporations more than 
doubled-a rate of increase of 6 per cent-well beyond the pace of innovation 
itself. 
The relation between patenting and innovation-especially significant 
improvements, innovations that significantly lower, say, costs of production 
or providing valued services at a higher cost-has been subject to extensive 
controversy (for discussion, see Hu and Jaffe in Chapter 3 of this volume; 
Kortum and Lerner (1998); Hall (2005); Lerner (2002); Jaffe and Lerner 
(2004); and Jaffe (2000)). 
Ca us al links 
Even if there is a relationship between innovation and the explosion of patents, 
the direction of causality is not clear. One hypothesis claims that the increase 
of patents has been largely the consequence of the acceleration of the rates of 
innovation, which would have taken place even with wealcer protection. This 
acceleration in innovation may, for instance, reflect a general increase in 
"technological opportunities" related, in particular, to the emergence of new 
technological paradigms such as those concerning information technologies 
and biotechnologies. (The latter is a field in which patents are a more 
important way to appropriability than in others. As search in the future shifts 
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The contrary hypothesis, suggested by tight IPR supporters, in our view 
without much evidence to back it, is that the changes in IPR regime are a 
primary "cause" of increased innovation rates. Conversely, those that doubt 
that the increase in patenting has caused an, increase in innovation sometimes 
go further, suggesting that changes both in the legal and institutional frame-
work, and in firms' strategies may have led to more patenting, with little 
relation to the underlying innovative activities. 
While it is difficult to come to sharp conclusions in the absence of coun-
terfactual experiments, some circumstantial evidence does lend some support 
to the latter hypothesis. 
Explaining the growth of patents 
Certainly part of the growth in the number of patents is simply due to the 
expansion of the patentability domain to new types of objects such as software, 
research tools, business methods, genes and artificially engineered organisms 
(see also Tirole, 2002, on the European case). Moreover, new actors have 
entered the patenting game, most notably universities and public agencies (see 
for example Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, and Ziedonis, 2001). 
Finally, corporate strategies vis-a-vis the legal claims of!PR also appear to 
have significantly changed. Patents have acquired importance among the non-
physical assets of firms as a means to signal the enterprise's value to potential 
investors, even well before the patented knowledge has been embodied in any 
marketable good. In this respect, the most relevant institutional change is to be 
found in the so called "Alternative 2" under the Nasdaq regulation (1984). 
This allowed "market entry and listing of firms operating at a deficit on the 
condition that they had considerable 'intangible' capital ... composed of!PR" 
(Coria! and Orsi 2006: 170).37 
At the same time, patents seems to have acquired a strategic value, quite 
independently from any embodiment in profitable goods. Even in those 
industries in which they were not considered as an important mechanism 
for appropriating the benefits from innovation: extensive portfolios of legal 
rights are considered means for entry deterrence (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001), 
and for infringement and counter-infringement suits against rivals. Texas 
Instruments, for instance, is estimated to have gained almost $1 billion a 
year from patent licenses and settlements resulting from its aggressive 
enforcement policy (Lerner 2010: 35). It is interesting to note that this practice 
has generated a new commercial strategy called "defensive publishing." 
According to this practice, firms who find it too expensive to build an 
extensive portfolio of patents tend to operuy describe an invention in order 
to place it in the "prior art" domain, thus preserving the option to employ that 
invention free from the interference of anyone who might eventually patent 
the same idea. 
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The increased role that patent litigation is playing has, in turn, lead to 
increased patenting: patenting is designed both to build fences (not just to 
extend the effective life of the patent, but to deter others from entering into the 
fray, lest they encroach on one of the myriad of patents), and to increase one's 
arsenal in response to a patent infringement suit, enhancing the likelihood of a 
counter-suit. While such patent fences may possibly raise the private rate of 
return to patenting itself (Jaffe 2000), they may do so without increasing the 
underlying rate of innovation-and they could even have an adverse effect. 
Kortum and Lerner (1998) present a careful account of different explan-
ations of recent massive increases in patenting rates, comparing different 
interpretations. They look carefully at two changes in the institutional struc· 
lure that may account for increased patenting. First, according to the "friendly 
court hypothesis," the balance between costs related to the patenting process 
(in terms e.g. of loss of secrecy) and the value of the protection that a patent 
affords to the innovator had been altered by an increase in the probability of 
successful application granted by the establishment in the United States of the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ( CAFC) specialized in patent cases-
regarded by most observers as a strongly pro-patent institution (cf Merges, 
1996). 
Second, the "capture" hypothesis (that the patent system has been captured 
by large corporate interests) tries to explain the surge of U.S. patent applica-
tions tracking it back to changes in the patent regime. Business firms in 
general and in particular larger corporations (whose propensity to patent 
has traditionally been higher than average) succeeded in inducing the 
U.S. government to change patent policy in their favor by adopting a stronger 
patent regime. 
Patents and innovation 
What we really care about, of course, is not whether there are few or more 
patents, but whether the patents are associated with more innovations, and in 
particular, whether there are more welfare-enhancing innovations~not me-
too innovations, and not innovations that serve to block others from engaging 
in innovation. 
Lerner (2002) presents evidence that if rates of innovation have increased in 
recent years, the increases were not the result of the change in the IPR regime 
and the associated increase in patents that it caused. Rather the growth in 
(real) R&D spending predates the strengthening of the IP regime. 
The apparent lack of effects of different IPR regimes upon the rates of 
innovation appears also from broad historical comparisons. For example, 
based on the analysis of data from the catalogues of two nineteenth-century 
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Centennial Exhibition in Philadelphia in 1876-Moser (2005) finds no evi-
dence that countries with stronger IP protection produced more innovations 
than those with weaker IP protection, though there is significant evidence of 
the influence of IP laws on the sectoral distribution of innovations. In weak IP 
countries, firms did innovate in sectors in which other forms of appropriation 
(e.g. secrecy and lead time) were more effective, whereas in countries with 
strong IP protection significantly more innovative effort went to the sectors in 
which these other forms were less effective. Hence, one can draw from Moser's 
study the interesting conclusion that patents' main effect could well be on the 
direction rather than on the rates of innovative activity. (And we have to 
remember that we are concerned not with just innovation per se, but welfare-
enhancing innovation. If the patent system shifts resources into research 
designed to innovate around a patent, the net welfare benefit may be negative.) 
More generally, the evidence suggests that the relationship between patents 
and innovation depends on the very nature of industry-specific knowledge 
bases, on industry stages in their life cycles, and on the industrial structure. 
Various surveys highlight both the differences among sectors and the limited 
role that patents play in many sectors. Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and Winter 
(1987), for instance, report that patents are by and large viewed as less 
important than learning curve advantages and lead time in protecting product 
innovation, and are the least effective among the means of appropriating 
returns from innovative investments for process innovations (see Table 1.1). 
Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000) present a follow-up to Levin et al. (1987), 
also addressing the impact of patenting on the incentive to undertake 
R&D. Again, they report on the relative importance of the variety of mech-
anisms used by firms to protect their innovations-including secrecy, lead 
time, complementary capabilities and patents: see again Table 1.1. The table 
suggests that the most effective instruments for product innovations are 
secrecy and lead time while patents are the least effective, with the partial 
exception of drugs and medical equipment. Interestingly, the most important 
reasons given for not patenting an innovation were (i) the difficulty of 
demonstrating novelty (that is, satisfying the conditions required to get a 
patent) (32 per cent), (ii) information disclosure (24 per cent), and (iii) ease 
of inventing around the patent (25 per cent). 
The uses of patents also differ for "complex" and "discrete" product indus-
tries. Complex products industries are those in which a product is protected by 
a large number of patents while discrete product industries are those in which 
a product is relatively simple and therefore associated with a small number of 
patents. In complex product industries, patents are used to block rival use of 
components and acquire bargaining strength in cross-licensing negotiations. 
In discrete product industries, patents are used to block substitutes by creating 
patent "fences'' (cf. Gallini, 2002; Ziedonis, 2004). 
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Table 1.1 Effectiveness of appropriability mechanism in product and process 
innovations, 1983 and 1994 surveys, United States, 33 manufacturing industries 
1.l(a). Product innovation 
Rank of importance of mechanisms, and number of industries in which a 
mechanism achieved that rank 
Mechanism 1st 2nd 3rd 4tl1 
1983 1994 1983 1994 1983 1994 1983 1994 
Patents 4 7 3 5 17 7 9 4 
Secrecy 0 13 0 11 11 2 22 5 
Lead time 14 10 14 8 5 7 0 7 
Sales & service 16 4 16 4 7 0 10 
Manufacturing* n.a. 3 n.a. 3 n.a. 14 n.a. 7 





Sales & service 
Manufacturing* 
Rank of importance of mechanisms, and number of industries in which a 
mechanism achieved that rank 
!st 2nd 3rd 4th 
1983 1994 1983 1994 1983 1994 1983 1994 
2 4 5 3 3 24 16 
2 21 10 10 19 2 0 
26 3 5 7 2 16 0 3 
4 0 16 0 7 3 6 11 
n.a. 10 n.a. 12 n.a. 10 n.a. 0 
The table shows the relative importance of each mechanism (e.g. patents) to appropriability in 33 different 
sectors. The column on the left lists the various mechanisms. The other columns list the possible ranking of 
their importance to appropr:iability {1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th), and the number of sectors in which a mechanism 
held that rank of importance for appropriability, in 1983 and 1994 respectively. *Manufacturing capabilities. 
Source: Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen, Nelson and Welsh (2000) as presented in Winter (2002) (n.a. for 
observations not available). 
It is interesting also to compare Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) with the 
older Levin et al. (1987), which came before the changes in the IPR regime and 
before the massive increase in patenting rates. Even with this increased use of 
patents, Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) report that patents are not the key 
means to appropriate returns from innovations in most industries. Secrecy, 
lead time and complementary capabilities are often perceived as being more 
important appropriability mechanisms. 
The example of the semicondnctor and other JCT industries 
Given that patents clearly play different roles in different industries, further 
insights can be gleaned by in-depth studies of particular industries. A number 
of scholars (Bess en and Maskin, 2000; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) have focused 
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on the role of patents in the semiconductor industry, one of the most dynamic 
sectors of the economy in recent decades. Bessen and Maskin (2000) observe 
that computers and semiconductors, while having been among the most 
innovative industries in the last forty years, have historically had weak patent 
protection and rapid imitation of their products. The short product life cycles 
and fast-paced innovation also may have played a role in this historical 
pattern. But then the software industry in the United States experienced a 
rapid strengthening of patent protection in the 1980s. Bessen and Maskin 
suggest that "far from unleashing a flurry of new innovative activity, these 
stronger property rights ushered in a period of stagnant, if not declining, R&D 
among those industries and firms that patented most" (2000: 2). Bessen and 
Maskin (2000) argue that this phenomenon is likely to occur in those indus-
tries characterized by a high degree of sequentiality (each innovation builds on 
a previous one) and complementarity (the simultaneous existence of different 
research lines enhances the probability that a goal might be eventually 
reached). A patent, in this perspective, actually prevents non-holders from 
the use of the idea (or of similar ideas) protected by the patent itself and in a 
sequential world full of complementarities this turns out to slowdown innov-
ation rates. Conversely, it might well happen that firms would be better off in 
an environment characterized by easy imitation, whereby it would be true that 
imitation would reduce current profits but it would also be the case that easy 
imitation would raise the probability of further innovation taking place and of 
further profitable innovations being realized later on.38 
In these sectors, the growth in patents might have been associated with the 
use of patents as "bargaining chips" in the exchanges of technology among 
different firms and in the attempts of rent extraction from each other. 
Again, the social value of research directed at obtaining such patents is 
likely to be limited, with the private value of such patents most likely exceeding 
the social value. 
Drugs: a second example 
In several respects, pharmaceuticals are an archetypical case for examining the 
role of IPR. It is one of the sectors for which IPR represents one of the more 
important mechanisms for appropriability. It is also the sector in which research 
is most affected by the Bayh-Dole Act and more generally by the exclusive 
appropriation of the results of research itself and the retreat of the boundaries of 
Open Science. It represents a sort of crucial institutional experiment (more on it 
in Angell, 2004; Mazzucato and Dosi, 2006; and Avorn, 2004). 
But the tightening of the patenting regime was followed by a fall in the rate 
of innovation-as proxied e.g. by the number of FDA-approved New Chem-
ical Entities (NCE) per year.39 While a good deal of the new discoveries were 
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and are based on research funded by or conducted by government agencies 
(Angell, 2004), a big share of early discoveries appropriated by biotech firms 
and "big pharma" companies have remained unfulfilled promises of new 
drugs, that is they never went all the way to clinical trials. Part of the 
explanation of the seeming lack of innovation is that meaningful innovations 
are only part of the drug companies' concern: currently, marketing, enforce-
ment of IPR-related rent extraction and search of me-too drugs (that is, 
marginal variations on incumbent, typically mass-market drugs for high 
income patients), all have a big share of major pharmaceutical companies' 
activities, while the uncertain experimentation of NCE, possibly effective only 
for subsets of patients with a certain disease, is far from a priority. All this is a 
powerful test-and indeed a very expensive one for the taxpayer and pur-
chaser of health care services-of the ineffectiveness, at best, of tightening and 
widening IPR as an incentive to greater efforts of innovative search, even in the 
presence of seemingly increasing science-driven notional opportunities. 
Part of the explanation of the failure of tighter IPR to enhance innovation 
may be the impediments that are posed for follow-on research and the adverse 
effects of the "institutional innovations" on the research process itself, by 
encouraging more secrecy. Part may rest in the effect that it had on the 
directions of search in favor of high-end, not-too-difficult to find "blockbus-
ters" and subsidized me-too drugs, addressing rich and aging populations.40 
As we shall discuss below, the picture is bleaker for developing countries. 
The role of appropriability more generally 
So far we have primarily discussed the relations between the regimes of IPR 
protection and rates of innovations, basically concluding that either the 
relation is not there, or if it is there that it might be a perverse one, with 
strong IPR enforcement actually deterring innovative efforts. 
However, we also know that IPR protection is only one of the mechanisms 
for appropriating returns from innovation, and certainly not the most import-
ant one. We should, then, also consider the impact of appropriability more 
generally. The question is not whether an increase in the extent of appropria-
bility increases investments in innovation in some sort of partial equilibrium 
model, given the inflow of knowledge. The question is what the broader impacts 
of stronger conditions for appropriability are, taking into account how they 
affect both incentives for investments and the dissemination of knowledge. In 
particular, stronger appropriability implies that the pool of "ideas" that are 
publicly available for researchers to draw upon may be smaller, and since 
technological opportunities are a (perhaps the) major driver of innovation, a 
reduced set of opportunities may actually lead to reduced innovation. 
Considering together tbe evidence on appropriability from survey data 
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Winter, 1987), the cross-sectoral evidence on technological opportunities 
(cf. Klevorick, Levin, Nelson and Winter, 1995) and the evidence from mul-
tiple sources on the modes, rates and directions of innovation (for two surveys, 
cf. Dosi, 1988; and Dosi and Nelson, 2010), the broad conclusion is that 
appropriability conditions above a minimum threshold generally have at 
most a limited effect on the level and pattern of innovation. Obviously, with 
zero appropriability, the incentive to innovate for private actors would 
vanish-everybody would want to be a free rider-but, as our previous 
discussion emphasized, with few exceptions innovators are always able to 
appropriate some returns from their innovations; flows of information are 
never perfect; and technological knowledge is often quite sticky indeed. Open 
source software shows that the threshold level of appropriability might indeed 
be very low. 
Opportunities, capabilities and greed: some general properties 
of the drivers of innovation and its private appropriation 
There are some basic messages from the foregoing discussion of the theory 
and empirical evidence on the relationship between the extent of IPR protec-
tion and rates of innovation. For corporate investments in research, it is 
obvious that there must be some private expectation (whether fulfilled or 
not) of "profiting from innovation." Nevertheless, there are neither strong 
theoretical reasons nor strong empirical evidence suggesting that modifying 
appropriability mechanisms for innovations in general-and appropriability 
by means of IPR in particular-has any clear, strong effect on the amount of 
resources that private, self-seeking agents devote to innovative search, nor on 
the rates at which they discover new products and new production processes. 
As Jaffe concluded after surveying the available literature, "there is little 
empirical evidence that what is widely perceived to be a significant strength-
ening of intellectual property protection had significant impact on the innov-
ation process" (2000: 540). 
Indeed, we have explained why"stronger" IPR may actually have an adverse 
effect on innovation. Again, as Jaffe concluded: 
to the extent that firms' attention and resources are, at the margin, diverted from 
innovation itself toward the acquisition, defence and assertion against others of 
property rights, the social return to the endeavour as a whole is likely to fall. While 
the evidence on all sides is scant, it is fair to say that there is at least much evidence of 
these effects of patent policy changes as there is evidence of stimulation of research. 
(2000: 555; see also Hu and Jaffe, Chapter 3 in this volume) 
But if IPR regimes have, at best, second-order effects on the rates of innov-
ation, the question remains of what the main determinants of the rates 
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and directions of innovation are. Our basic answer, as argued in more detail 
elsewhere (cf. Cimoli, Dosi, and Stiglitz, 2009; and Dosi and Nelson, 2010) is 
the following. The fundamental determinants of observed rates of innovation 
in individnal industries/technologies appear to arise from the extent of the 
opportunities that each indnstry faces. To understand this, it may be useful 
to think of an "opportunity sea" in which incumbents and entrants go fishing 
for innovation. A broader, deeper, richer sea contains more opportunities 
for innovation, stemming from a variety of sources. In part, they are generated 
by research institutions outside the business sector. Others spring from the 
search efforts incumbent firms have undertaken in the past. Moreover, yet 
others are generated and flow through the economic system via the relation-
ships between suppliers and users41 (see the detailed inter-sectoral compari-
sons and taxonomy in Pavitt, 1984, and Klevorick, et al., 1995). But patents 
restrict the flow of knowledge into the "opportunity sea," and in doing so, have 
an adverse effect on the most important determinant of progress. Conversely, 
in most industries, the possibilities for appropriating returns-even with a 
wealc IPR regime-are sufficient to induce firms to go out to "fish in the sea of 
opportunities." 
In short, a full analysis has to take into account not just the effect of an IPR 
regime in inducing more innovation given the set of technological opportun-
ities, but how a tighter IPR regime enables successful innovators to "enclose 
the commons," which reduces the amount of knowledge in the knowledge 
pool that could be the basis for further patentable research; as well as reducing 
the extent to which the induced innovations contribute to the pool of know-
ledge from which others may eventually draw. Tighter IPR regimes enable 
innovators to take more out of the pool and to contribute less to the pool, so 
that the size of the pool is diminished, so much so that the actual level of 
innovation may be diminished (Stiglitz, 2013c). 
Indeed, one observes large differences in the innovative activity of different 
firms having little to do with any legal regime governing the access to the use 
of supposedly publicly disclosed but legally restricted knowledge, such as that 
associated with patent-related information. While the "rates of fishing" de-
pend essentially on the size and richness of the sea, idiosyncratic differences in 
the rates of success in the fishing activity itself depend to a large extent on 
firm-specific capabilities.42 Increasing appropriability has little effect-given a 
particular level of capabilities and opportunities-upon the rates of invest-
ment and R&D spending. And if that is so, then the adverse effects of stronger 
IPR on the technological opportunity set may dominate any positive effect of a 
change in how much society decides to compensate the fishermen for their 
catch. (Tighter IPR may itself impede the diffusion of learning capabilities 
among firms, thereby further diminishing the overall pace of innovation.) 
While the effects of a stronger IPR regime on innovation are ambiguous, its 
effects on distribution are not. It gives rise to monopoly power. This leads to 
Int 
higher prices a 
But in some se 
even worse: h1 
higher drug pr 
more question 
We should, 
matter. It is nc 
design. We ha 
United States ' 
the IPR regim. 
regime (and a 
effects. For ins: 
some of the a 
adverse budge 
laws would re< 
practices of th 
more general 
U.S. IPR regin 
reducing the S< 
A country's in 
innovation; it 
vid uals and cc 
resources amo1 
concerned witl 
the economy, i 
production pre 
There are m 
property rights 
Much research 
on within unh 
laboratories, ty 




direction of in 
research are use 
for instance, af 
more detail 
on, 2010) is 
-innovation 
ICl:ent of the 
iy be useful 
ts go fishing 
pportunities 
re generated 




. But patents 
oing so, have 
. Conversely, 
-even with a 
1 in the sea of 
feet of an IPR 
cal opportun-
rs to ''enclose 
1e knowledge 
'll as reducing 
JOO! of know-
'gimes enable 
:o the pool, so 
actual level of 
ity of different 
cess to the use 
~e, such as that 
of fishing" de-
: differences in 
arge extent on 
effect-given a 
cates of invest-
ects of stronger 
sitive effect of a 
!fmen for their 
ing capabilities 
innovation.) 
! ambiguous, its 
er. This leads to 
Intellectual Property Rights in the Development Process 27 
higher prices and lower consumer welfare (at any given level of innovation).43 
But in some sectors, like pharmaceuticals, the adverse effects of patents can be 
even worse: how are we to evaluate the unnecessary deaths associated with 
higher drug prices?44 As a result, the overall benefits of stronger IPR are even 
more questionable. 
We should, of course, bear in mind our earlier in1portant message: details 
matter. It is not only a matter of the "strength" of the IPR regime, but also its 
design. We have described some of the effects of the IPR regin1es that the 
United States and other countries have had, and how some of the changes in 
the IPR regime have affected innovation. There are some changes in the IPR 
regin1e (and other associated legal regin1es) that would reduce the adverse 
effects. For instance, more extensive use of compulsory licensing would reduce 
some of the adverse welfare effects from unnecessary deaths and from the 
adverse budgetary consequences; more effective enforcement of competition 
laws would reduce some of the adverse welfare effects from anticompetitive 
practices of those who attempt to leverage the monopoly of the patent into 
more general market power. Later, we will describe a recent change in the 
U.S. IPR regime that may reduce the adverse effects of the patent thicket, by 
reducing the scope for holdups. 
IV. PATENTS AND A COUNTRY'S 
INNOVATION SYSTEM45 
A country's innovation system is the collection of institutions that promote 
innovation; it fosters the accumulation of technological capabilities in indi-
viduals and corporations; it provides incentives and finance, and allocates 
resources among researchers and research projects. The innovation system is 
concerned with the production and dissemination of knowledge throughout 
the economy, including the creation of new products and the improvement of 
production processes. 
There are many components of an innovation system besides intellectual 
property rights (see e.g. Freeman (1987), Lundvall (2010) and Nelson (2004b).) 
Much research-and especially basic research, the most foundational-goes 
on within universities, not-for-profit research institutions, and government 
laboratories, typically financed by government, sometin1es in partnership with 
the private sector, sometin1es supported by foundations.46 
In evaluating alternative innovation systems, there are several criteria. The 
ultimate objective is the well-being of society and its dynamics (that is, not just 
well-being now, but in the future). That, in turn, is affected by the pace and 
direction of innovation and the efficiency with which resources devoted to 
researffi are used. But the innovation system does not exist in isolation. It can, 
for instance, affect the competitiveness and efficiency of the entire economy, 
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the extent of inequality in society and the health of its citizens. It can even have 
large budgetary consequences, as in the United States, as government pays 
pharmaceutical companies large amounts for drugs, the production costs of 
which are but a fraction of what the government pays-in some cases, even for 
drugs based largely on government-financed research. 
In recent years, two other institutional arrangements (besides IPR and 
government supported research) have grown (and regrown) in importance 
as part of a modern innovation system: prizes and open source. 
The prize system represents one alternative to the patent system for pro-
viding incentives for research. This entails giving a prize to whomever comes 
up with an innovation, or at least those innovations that meet announced 
objectives. For instance, the person who finds a cure or a vaccine for AIDS or 
malaria would get a big prize. Someone who comes up with a drug with 
slightly different side effects than existing drugs (but which is otherwise no 
more effective) might get a small prize. The size of the prize is calibrated by the 
magnitude of the contribution. 
The idea is an old one. The UK's Royal Society for the Encouragement of 
Arts, Manufactures and Commerce has been advocating and using prizes to 
incentivize the development of needed technologies for more than a century. 
For instance, an alternative was needed for chimney sweeps, those small, 
underfed boys who used to be sent down chimneys. It was not good for 
their health, but not cleaning chimneys meant increasing the risk of fire, 
with serious consequences. So the Royal Society offered a prize to anybody 
who invented a mechanical way of cleaning chimneys. The prize provided an 
incentive-and it worked. A patent system might also have motivated the 
development of a mechanical device (though it did not), but if it had, there 
would have been a problem: the owner of the patent would have wanted to 
maximize the return on his innovation by charging a high fee for its use. That 
would have meant that only rich families could have afforded to use the 
mechanical device, and young boys' lives would have continued to be put at 
risk. With the prize system, everyone ended up henefitting from this socially 
important innovation. 
The current patent system is, of course, similar to a prize system, but it is an 
inefficient one, hecause the "prize" is a grant of monopoly power, and with 
monopoly power there are incentives to restrict the use of the knowledge. One 
of the characteristics of a desirable innovation system is that the ideas and 
innovations, once developed, are widely used and disseminated; to the con-
trary, the patent system is designed to restrict the use of knowledge. With the 
prize system, a competitive market ensures a reasonably efficient dissemin-
ation: giving licenses to a large number of actors enables competition to drive 
down the price and to increase the use of the knowledge. With both patents 
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restrict knowledge and raise prices, the other is the force of competitive 
markets to drive down prices and extend the benefit of knowledge widely. 
Moreover, the prize system has the advantage of creating fewer incentives to 
waste money on advertising and to engage in anticompetitive behaviors 
designed to enhance monopoly profits. Drug companies spend more on 
advertising and marketing than they do on research.47 Much of these market-
ing expenditures are designed to reduce the elasticity of demand, which allows 
the owner of the patent to raise prices and increase monopoly profits. From a 
social point of view, these expenditures are dissipative. 
The patent system also distorts the pattern of research: drug companies 
have insufficient incentives to develop medicines for the diseases that tend to 
afflict poor people, simply because there is no money in those drugs.48 And as 
we have already noted, there are other distortions: incentives for research 
to get a share of the rents through me-too patents, to extend the life of the 
patent, through evergreening, to get "blocking" patents that can extract rents 
in holdups. 
The fourth alternative way of promoting innovation, open source, has 
become especially important in IT, but has spread from there to other sectors 
(see Henry and Stiglitz, 2010; Hertel, Krishnan and Slaughter, 2003; Lerner 
and Tirole, 2002; Weber, 2005). It highlights and strengthens the collaborative 
nature of research that is the hallmark of academia, and the open architecture 
facilitates follow-on research, in contrast to the patent system which closes it 
down. As in academia, in some instances non-pecuniary returns play a crucial 
role in motivating research; in other cases, firms have found a variety of ways 
of appropriating returns, e.g. through the sale of services or tailoring software 
based on open source to the needs of particular clients. 
There is still a fifth alternative, already described: let firms appropriate 
returns through natural markets using the non-IPR mechanisms (the advan-
tage of being first, etc.) described earlier. 
Table 1.2 provides a chart of some of the attributes of the five alternatives we 
have described. 
Any innovation system has to solve the problems of finance, selection (who 
gets research money) and incentives. There are, in addition, problems of 
coordination of research efforts. How these tasks are solved will affect the 
efficiency of the system-including the uncertainty and transaction costs 
facing market participants. Every country should have a portfolio of instru-
ments, bnt in onr view, too much weight has been assigned to patents in the 
current U.S. portfolio. 
The first attribute listed is selection. One problem facing any innovation 
system is how to select those to engage in research activities. A possible 
advantage (bnt also a possible bias) of both the patent and prize system is 
that they are decentralized and based on self-selection. Those who think that 
they are able to successfully undertake the research in a particular 
Table 1.2 Comparing alternative systems 
Innovation system 
Attribute Patent Prize 
Government-funded Open source Non-IPR market 
research appropriation 
Selection Decentralized, self- Decentralized, self-
Bureaucratic. Decentralized, self-selection. Decentralized, self-
selection. selection. 
selection. 
Lacks Lacks coordination. More coordination 
Sometimes "self" Lacks coordination. 
coordination. possible. 
coordination. 
Finance (tax) Highly Can be less Most efficient. 
May be underfinanced. Likely to be less 
distortionary and distortionary and more 
Foundations, government, distortionary than patent. 
inequitable. equitable. 
by-product of other activities. 
Less risk. Least risk Limited. 
Limited. 
Risk Litigation risk 
Innovation incentives Strong but Strong, less distorted. 
Strong non-monetary Strong-often non-pecuniary. Strong, less distorted. 
distorted. Requires well-defined incentives. 
objectives. 
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technological field make the investment, risking their own money, in the belief 
that they have a good chance of winning the prize (the formal prize or the 
prize of the patent). This would seem to be a significant advantage of the prize 
and patent systems over government-funded research, in which there is a 
group of peers (or bureaucrats) deciding on the best searchers.49•50 In some 
countries, there is obviously also a concern about "capture" of the research-
awarding process, e.g., by political or economic interests whose agendas may 
be separate from or counter to the advancement of science and technology. At 
the same time, self-selection does not necessarily result in the best researchers 
undertaking research, but rather the most confident, or those with the deepest 
pockets. Thus, patent races and prizes put smaller firms at a disadvantage. To 
the extent that those that enter the fray are those that are the most overcon-
fident, though innovation might proceed more slowly than it would in an 
alternative system, at least the costs of the mistakes are not borne by the 
public. 
With respect to finance, the patent system is the worst of the systems. It is 
highly distortionary and inequitable in the way in which funds to support 
research are raised-by charging monopoly prices, e.g., in the case of phar-
maceuticals, on the sick. 
By the same token, the transaction costs (especially those associated with 
litigation) and the distortions in the economic system are much higher with a 
patent system than with the other two. (And there is some evidence that those 
costs are increasing, together with the firms' propensity to litigate.)51 
Regarding the dissemination of knowledge and its efficient use, govern-
ment-funded research, the prize system and open source are best (because 
knowledge is generally made freely available), and the patent system is 
the worst, given that it relies on monopolization, which entails high prices 
and restricted usage. In short, under the prize and the government-funded 
research systems, knowledge, once acquired, is more efficiently used. These are 
among the key advantages of these alternatives. 
There is a big difference in the nature of the risk faced by researchers (which 
in modern economies often happen to be firms) operating in the different 
systems. With respect to risk, the patent system is the worst and the govern-
ment-funded system is the best, because it has the advantages of paying for the 
input rather than the output. That is to say, a researcher gets money for his 
time and other resources spent doing the research, whereas in the prize and 
the patent systems researchers are rewarded only if their research is 
successful-and successful before their rivals. 
Risk is increased too within the prize and patent system by problems of 
coordination. One of the disadvantages of both the patent and the prize 
systems is the lack of coordination. The lack of coordination reduces the 
efficiency of the innovation process and increases risk. The difficulties of 
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coordination are increased by secrecy which is encouraged by the IPR 
regime. Relatedly, one of the risks that each researcher faces is that of costly 
litigation. 
One of the reasons that risk (in fact, most often in the case of innovation, 
"Knightian" uncertainty which cannot be reduced to objective probabilities) is 
important is that users and consumers ultimately have to pay for the risk 
borne by researchers. People and firms52 tend to be risk averse, and if they 
must bear risk, they demand to be compensated for doing so (through higher 
prices and mark-ups). The patent system makes society bear the cost of that 
risk in an inefficient way. Under the government-financed research system, 
not only is risk lower, but it is shared by society in a more efficient way. 
Innovation incentives are strong in the patent system, but they are distorted. 
The prize system can provide strong incentives, but the incentives are de-
signed to foster socially desirable innovation, in contrast to the distorted 
incentives of the patent system, discussed earlier in this introduction.53 
On most accounts, the prize system dominates the patent system; but the 
prize system has one limitation: it does not work when the objective is not 
well-defined. There are, however, many areas, such as health, energy conser-
vation and carbon emissions reductions, in which there are well-defined 
objectives. The prize system will never fully replace the patent system. At 
the same time, in basic research-the foundation on which everything else is 
built-government-funded research will continue to remain at the core of the 
innovation system. It would be a disaster otherwise: the costs of restricting the 
usage of more basic knowledge associated with the patent system far outweigh 
any purported benefits. 
V. IPR IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
What we have said so far applies to countries more or less on the "techno-
logical frontier." The drawbacks of IPR, especially poorly designed IPR 
regimes, are significantly amplified when tight IPR regimes are applied in 
countries attempting to catch up with the more advanced industrial countries. 
As we note in the preface, what separates developed from developing countries 
today is as much a gap in knowledge as a gap in resources. Access to 
knowledge is essential. But the intellectual property regime denies them access 
to knowledge and/or requires that they pay large rents to firms in the devel-
oped countries. 
This is a core topic of this book analyzed from different angles, especially in 
the Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 7 of this volume and also in Odagiri, Goto, Sunami 
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and Nelson (2010), which is in many respects complementary to this one, as it 
takes a historical perspective of inter-country comparisons. 
"Tight" intellectual property rights regimes tend to hinder the development 
of local technological capabilities in general and absorptive capabilities in 
particular, since they hinder the activities of reverse engineering and trnitative 
experimentation which are typically at the core of the development process. 
As discussed in the introduction to Odagiri et al. (2010), and also in 
Chapters 2 and 16, learning in catching-up countries takes place mainly via 
the following (partly complementary) mechanisms: 
(i) Mobility of people either in the form of the "peaceful conquest" 
(Pollard, 1981), i.e. the emigration of technicians from frontier coun-
tries to catching-up ones-as it occurred in the nineteenth century in 
Continental Europe and the United States, with many coming from 
the U.K.; or in the form of students and technicians coming for 
periods of training in Europe and the United States from Japan and 
later South Korea, China, etc. and then returning back home. 
(ii) Open source forms of knowledge dissemination, including exhibitions-
quite important in the nineteenth century-conferences, papers, more 
recently internet and even patent documents. 
(iii) Investment goods-especially machine tools and instruments-that 
"embody" advances in knowledge. Knowledge is also transmitted 
and developed as those in the catching-up countries learn how to 
effectively use these advanced investment goods. 
(iv) Imitation, reverse engineering, or sheer copying of foreign products 
and capital inputs by domestic firms. 
(v) Formal licensing of patented technologies and know-how by domestic 
firms. 
(vi) Inter-firm technology transfer by MNCs to their subsidiaries in emer-
ging economics. 
(vii) Technological spillovers from MNCs themselves to other firms in 
catching-up countries, especially as a result of the training of workers. 
In addition, several emerging markets (particularly China and Brazil) have 
become a source of innovations in their own right. In some areas, they have 
moved to the frontier: China, for instance, in solar technology; Brazil in deep-
water drilling for oil and sugar-based ethanol. Patent grants to residents of 
China have soared in recent years, from 5,395 in 2001to112,347 in 2011.54 
The reason we have provided this long list of channels through which the 
knowledge gap is reduced is that Western advocates ofIPR emphasize only a 
few channels that might be enhanced by stronger IPR-including MNC-
rnediated and license-mediated transfer of technology. But IPR may have 
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adverse effects on other channels (e.g. those associated with the transfer of 
knowledge/products/processes via imitation and learning from developed to 
developing countries). Indeed, the historical record shows that these other 
mechanisms have typically been paramount in successful episodes of indus-
trialization (more in Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz, 2009).55 And if the latter are 
more important (as they probably are in most developing countries), then 
negative effects outweigh the positive. In fact, the evidence that stronger IPR 
regimes are effective in fostering technology transfer is far from conclusive 
(more in Fink and Maskus, 2005; Odagiri et al., 2010; Hu and Jaffe, Chapter 3 
in tbis volume). 
VI. THE IMPACT OF TRIPS 
TRIPS bas brought increased international harmonization. But is it likely to 
bring increased innovation to developing countries? Was there excessive 
harmonization? And was the harmonization around the rigbt standards? 
We suggest that this new IPR regime tends to be, other things being equal, a 
hindrance to the process of development and catching-up, precisely because it 
impedes many of the ways by which knowledge is transferred to developing 
countries: it tends to hinder, for instance, imitation by domestic firms and 
accumulation oflocal technological capabilities. These were indeed the instrn-
ments which developed countries-from the United States, to Germany, to 
Japan-used abundantly during the course of their catching up. Interestingly, 
later, those same countries "kicked away the ladder" (Chang, 2002), re-writing 
history as they sought to depict their earlier success as a result of free-trade 
with strong IPR (more in Odagiri et al., 2010; and in Chapter 2 in this 
volume).56 
For developing countries, there is a further concern: the "new" IPR regime 
may result in massive transfers of money from developing to developed 
countries (that, of course, was the intent when setting it up!). To reduce the 
gap in knowledge, developing countries are being asked to increase the gap in 
resources. Under the new TRIPS regime the flow of international licenses from 
developed to developing countries in monetary terms significantly increased 
(Maskus, 2005; Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2001). However it is less 
clear-cut whether this is due to an actual increase in the flow of technology 
transfers (the flow of knowledge) or in the costs of such transfers-that is, 
ultimately in the rents extracted out of the licensing of each piece of techno-
logical knowledge. 
In some circumstances, such as in the pharmaceutical industry, the evidence 
is particularly striking. Before TRIPS, generics obtained under loose IPR 
regimes were able to dramatically reduce the cost of drugs available to 
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Table 1.3 Costs of first and second line HIV treatments in Western and developing 
countries 
Lamivudine/stavudine/ Tenofovir/didanosine/ 2nd line vs. 1st line 
nevirapine (1st line) opinavi (2ndline) 
Western countriesa U.S. $8,773/yr U .. s. $13,551/yr LS times more 
expensive 
Developing countries U.S. $154/yr U.S. $3,950/yr 26 times more 
CiplaTriomuneb Originator product expensive 
Reduction -98% -70% 
a Australian EXW prices: Schedule of Phannaceutical Benefits for Approved Pharmacists and Medical 
Practioners, May 2004. Exchange rate used for conversion 1 AUD =0.72213 USD, 1 May 2004. 
b Clinton Foundation price (FOB) + 10% due to transportation and importation laxes. 
Source: E. t'Hoen (2005) and elaborations by Coriat, Orsi, and d'Almeida (2006). 
developing countries. A vivid illustration concerns anti-retroviral drugs 
against the HIV virus where generics were able to reduce the cost by between 
98 per cent and 70 per cent (cf. Table 1.3, from Coria! et al, 2006; and 
Chapter 7 in this volume). 
More generally, the evidence discussed in Coriat and Orsenigo in this 
volume suggests that large increases in the prices of drugs in developing 
countries, ranging between 50 per cent and 400 per cent, resulted from the 
implementations of TRIPS. And all that, of course, without evidence that 
these higher prices have led either to more drug innovation in general, let 
alone more innovation attempting to address the needs of those in developing 
countries. 
There are no major pharmaceutical companies in the developing world and 
a good deal ofleaming and catching-up-in India, Israel, Thailand, China and 
Brazil-occurred precisely with the production of generics, under loose IPR 
protection most often covering only processes of production but not products. 
And all this is now banned, or at least, significant barriers have been imposed 
to the introduction of generics, and so innovation in developing countries is 
impeded. (Note that the benefits of establishing a generics industry may go 
well beyond the lower prices; on the basis of the learning associated with 
generics, a broader industry can be established.) 
Yet another archetypal case is agriculture. If one takes the long-term view as 
the chapters by Nuvolari and Tartari, and by Halewood do-this is a sector 
where technological improvements have taken place over decades and cen-
turies, in the absence of any IPR protection, though at a slower pace until the 
nineteenth century, when-still without any IPR protection-dramatic agri-
cultural advances occurred (allowing a small proportion of the labor force to 
produce all of the food demanded even as incomes rose), significantly helped 
by public institutions such as Land Grant Colleges in the United States and 
similar ones in Europe. 
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The scenario changed a good deal with the introduction of high-productivity, 
(quasi-) sterile seeds. The originators of innovation began to successfully 
demand a powerful "technical protection" on the flow of outputs from their 
innovations. Chapter 9 in this volume explores the difference between "if you 
want a seed as productive as last year, you are bound to come back to me, and 
at my prices" as compared to "if you buy the seeds which I originated, without 
paying some royalty to me I will bring you to court in Burkina Faso." The 
outcome, as Swanson and Goeschl highlight, is much lower rates of innovation 
diffusion and a greater divergence vis-a-vis the moving international product-
ivity boundaries-no matter how measured. 
An intellectual property regime for developing countries 
This book offers a detailed diagnostics of the impact of IPR on developing 
countries at multiple levels-including the rates and direction of scientific 
search and technological innovation, the rates and patterns of international 
diffusion of technological knowledge, and more generally its effects on the 
developing countries' catching-up process. 
At the same time, this book is equally rich in the exploration of policy 
measures fostering the international diffusion of knowledge, the accumulation 
of capabilities in catching-up countries and the access by the populations in 
emerging economies of the fruits of technological innovation. Chapter 6 draws 
upon U.S. experiences in formulating policy lessons for governance of publicly 
financed research by developing countries. Chapter 7 discusss the policy 
agenda in the area of pharmaceuticals in the post-2005 international TRIPS 
regime. Chapter 10 analyzes the possibilities of securing a global common in 
plant genetic resources, while Chapter 11 deals with the ways of nurturing 
open source modes of governance of biotech knowledge in emerging econ-
omies. Chapter 12 examines the role of IPR with respect to innovations 
curbing greenhouse gases in general, and in developing countries in particular, 
while Chapter 13 considers different arrangements aimed at the diffusion to 
the developing countries of environmentally sound technologies. 
Finally, the last three chapters look at IPR and their consequences from the 
point of view of the international governance institutions and the role of IPR 
policies in the broader context of industrial policies. Chapter 14 discusses in 
depth the "opportunities" (i.e. the "flexibilities") still available to developing 
countries under the TRIPS regime, opportunities which bilateral and multi-
lateral trade agreements attempt to restrict, as Spenneman and Roffe show in 
Chapter 15. Burlamaqui and Cimoli in Chapter 16 continue in this vein, 
exploring links between IPR, industrial policy, and the reach and limits of 
the "governance of knowledge." 
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We have suggested that excessive attention has been given to IPR-related 
policies, and that more progress would have been made ifIPR had been viewed 
within the broader context of an innovation system, of which IPR is only one 
component. Equally or more inlportant from the perspective of"catching up" 
are industrial policies focusing on the development of domestic technological 
and organizational capabilities. This is the thrust of Chapter 16. Unfortunate-
ly, the 1995 Uruguay Round not only created an intellectual property regime 
that was not pro-development, but also imposed restrictions on the ability of 
developing countries to effectively use industrial policies. 
We shall come back to several of these policy themes in the conclusion to 
this book. 
VII. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN IPR 
AND INNOVATION SYSTEMS 
Everywhere, intellectual property rights are in flux, as changes in technology 
and the economy pose challenges to existing perspectives. The battle is not just 
one between civil society and consumer groups, on the one hand, and large 
corporations on the other. There is also a battle among different business 
interests, battles that illustrate the central themes of this book-intellectual 
property is man-made, designed to enhance societal well-being, and there can 
be large distributive effects. But if we don't design the IPR system well, it may 
impede innovation. It may help large established firms, with their army of 
patent lawyers, at the expense of small firms. 
It is not just the laws themselves that matter, but how they are interpreted 
by the courts and the agencies that administer them. In the concluding section 
of this introduction, we discuss two recent developments that illustrate how 
courts and administrative agencies are trying to come to terms with the 
dangers of unbalanced IPR regimes. 
The first is a path-breaking decision of the Supreme Court in a case called 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C. 57 In the past, patents have typically been 
enforced through "injunctions" -others cannot trespass on a patent without 
the permission of the patent holder, who can extract as much "rent" as he 
wishes. This is in contrast with many other areas, where there is compensation 
for violating someone's rights or property. The Supreme Court itself has raised 
questions about the consequences of what might be termed excessive enforce-
ment though actions by patent holders that in effect "exclude" those who 
might infringe upon the patent. In eBay, the Court ruled that a permanent 
injunction (against infringement) would only be granted if a four-part test was 
satisfied: 
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A [patent] plaintiff must demonstrate: (I) that it has suffered an irreparable 
injury; (2) that remedies at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to 
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between 
the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and ( 4) that the 
public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. 
An extreme version of exclusion is still part of America's trade laws, where a 
firm that the International Trade Commission finds has violated an Ameri-
can's intellectual property rights can have the infringing products excluded 
from importation into the United States. In 2012, a small company, X2Y, sued 
Intel, Apple and HP to exclude all oflntel's advanced microprocessors, all of 
Apple's computers (which employ these microprocessors), and those HP 
computers that do so. The claim was that these microprocessors infringed, 
in their "packaging," on a X2Y patent. X2Y had offered to sell this and a 
bundle of other patents for a few million dollars. Intel viewed it as a holdup 
and refused. The cost to Intel, Apple and HP-let alone to the U.S. economy-
of the exclusion would have been in the order of billions of dollars.
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The law providing for the exclusion had a narrow exception-the exclusion 
order was not to be issued if it was against the public interest. But the ITC had 
so narrowly defined the exception that it had been used only four times in 
forty years. The irony, of course, was that a law designed to protect American 
firms against foreign firms who violated the intellectual property rights of 
Americans was being used by a small American firm that had spent a 
miniscule amount on research-and far more on lawyers-to hold up some 
of America's leading IT companies who were spending billions on research. 
Those who argued against the exclusion order contended that exclusion would 
not only have a large negative effect on the economy in the short run, but also 
that it would actually be counterproductive, inhibiting innovation. 
The second example is from a developing country-India-and shows once 
again how the interpretation of laws can be critical. Before TRIPS, India had 
had a thriving generic drug industry. The patent laws that India passed as part 
of its implementation of the obligations it undertook as part of TRIPS had put 
this important industry in jeopardy. A recent Court decision refusing to grant 
a patent to a Western drug company provided new life, and not only for the 
generic drug industry. The lower price of drugs of the generics provided 
lifesaving medicines for those in the developing countries that otherwise 
would never have been able to afford them. 
Earlier in this paper, we noted the influence of special interest groups in 
shaping the intellectual property regime. It is not designed to maximize 
innovation or societal well-being, even in the developed countries, but even 
less so in developing countries; rather, it is more concerned with maximizing 
rents to certain types of innovation activities. Even within TRIPS, developing 
countries have much more discretion than they have taken advantage of. 
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:They should shape the intellectual property regime to advance the well-being 
'of their citizens. For instance, drug companies regnlarly try to extend the life of 
::: their patents through "ever-greening." But most such attempts fail a reason-
able standard of "obviousness." It is, for example, obvious how to move from 
the standard version of a drug to the tinJe release version. Hence, developing 
countries should not grant patents for the time release version, even if the drug 
companies succeed in getting developed countries to provide such patents. 
Intellectual property is complex. If nothing else, this introduction, and the 
chapters in this book, should have convinced the reader that the mantra of the 
advocates of stronger IPR-that the stronger the system of intellectual prop-
erty rights, the faster the pace of innovation-has itself no intellectual basis. It 
is too simplistic, partly because property rights are too multifaceted to be 
summarized in a simple linear way (from weaker to stronger), partly because 
innovation is multifaceted: even if there were more patents, it doesn't mean 
that societal welfare is necessarily increasing, partly because it ignores the 
multitude of other ways in which the returns to innovation are appropriated, 
and it ignores the multitude of other drivers of innovation. And even if there 
were more innovation, somehow defined, it doesn't mean that societal welfare 
is increased: ilie innovations could be directed at enhancing and extending 
monopoly power, at increasing rents or seizing other firms' rents. IPR needs to 
be seen as part, but only part, of a country's innovation system. 
Because innovation is complex, designing a good IPR system that promotes 
innovation is complex-and perhaps even more so in developing countries. 
But it should be clear that an IPR system iliat is appropriate for the United 
States and Europe (even if iliey had a well-designed IPR system) would not 
necessarily be appropriate for developing countries. 
Our hope is that this book will help developing countries resist the temp-
tation to just adopt the IPR regimes of the advanced countries, to whose 
innovation system iliey aspire. Our hope too is that the insights it provides 
will help them design an IPR system that enliances their growth and the 
well-being of ilieir citizens. 
NOTES 
1. This introduction is based in part on earlier work by the authors on the issues of 
intellectual property, aod especially Stiglitz (2004, 2006, 2008, 2013a, 2013b ), Henry 
and Stiglitz (2010), Dosi and Nelson (2010) and Dosi, Marengo and Pasquali 
(2006). The authors are indebted to the participants in the !PD/Brooks World 
Poverty Center conference in Manchester (8-10 September 2010) and in the IPD/ 
ECLAC conference, "Towards Inclusive Development in Latin America and Chile" 
(29-30 August 2011) for key insights into the issues described here, and to their 
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many collaborators in their work on intellectual property. We would like to 
acknowledge the assistance of Ritam Chaurey and the financial support of the 
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET), New York, and Scuola Superiore 
Sant' Anna, Pisa, Italy. 
2. It should be clear that the term "trade-related" was only used to enable intellectual 
property to be included as part of a trade agreement. The thrust of trade agree-
ments was to open borders to the free movement of goods and services (and in 
some cases factors); TRIPS was designed to restrict the free flow of knowledge. 
Interestingly, this critic.al view of TRIPS is even held by strong advocates of 
multilateral trade agreements. For a critique of the inclusion of intellectual 
property rights in trade agreements, see Stiglitz (2006) and Bhagwati (2004). 
3. Statement by Brazil on 30 September 2004 before WIPO General Assembly at the 
introduction of the proposal for a development agenda. 
4. The patents on basmati rice and the medicinal uses of turmeric were eventually 
overthrown, but the costs of litigation were significant (see Stiglitz, 2006 and 
Brand, 2005). Indeed, even the U.S. courts have recognized these costs. In United 
States v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 844 (1953) the court, in arguing for 
compulsory licensing -with zero royalties, noted that "small firms desiring to stay 
in or gain a foothold in the industry ... may well be unequipped to engage in 
litigation on the validity of one patent after another at what could be incalculable 
expense. In order to avoid it they could be required to shoulder royalties which 
could prove to be the very factor that would push them out of the competitive 
circle of the market" (cited in Love, 2005). See Stiglitz (2006) and Perleman (2002). 
5. Opposition of drug companies on this issue also underlay the reluctance of some 
developed countries besides the United States to ratify the bio-diversity conven-
tion. (See Henry and Stiglitz, 2010 for a brief discussion.) 
6. From Stiglitz (2013a). 
7. For a recent discussion of some of the controversies associated with intellectual 
property rights, see the winter, 2013 symposium of the Journal of Economic 
Perspectives. 
8. That there is a large disparity between private and social returns has become 
increasingly recognized. See, for instance, Shapiro (2007) or Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (2014a, 2014b, 2014c). 
9. In recent years, there has developed a broad critique of intellectual property -within 
the economics literature. See, e.g. Bessen ((2008), Boldrin and Levine (2013), and 
Moser (2013). 
10. There is, by now, a large literature not only questioning this standard -wisdom, but 
supporting the theses which we have articulated in the previous paragraph. See, for 
instance, Boldrin and Levine (2010), Boyle (2003), Granstrand (2005), Scotchmer 
(2004), Winter (1993) and the many other references in the bibliography of this 
introduction and Chapter 2 in this volume. 
11. Nonetheless, in much of the discussion below we shall) for simplicity, follow the 
conventional practice of referring to "strong" or "tight" IPR regimes. Much of the 
discussion here and below borrows from Stiglitz (2013a). 
12. This was one of the central messages of Stiglitz (2002). 
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13. There is another mechanism by which patents may lead to more innovation, by 
facilitating a market for innovations, and thus making investments in innovation 
more liquid and stimulating the diffusion of knowledge. (See Arora, Fosfuri, and 
Gambardella, 2001 and Maskus, 2005, for detailed analyses). While it is certainly 
true that some IPR protection is often a necessary condition for the development 
of markets for technologies, there is no clear evidence that more protection means 
a better market for technology or that "better markets" mean more innovation. 
Rather, the degree to which technological diffusion occurs via market exchange 
depends to a great extent on the nature of technological knowledge itself, includ-
ing its degree of codifiability. 
14. For a brief discussion of the case, see Stiglitz (2013d). 
15. Even this statement is not entirely accurate: optimal production and investment-
if firms were able to define them-would then take into account the learning 
benefits, and thus production or investment would be greater than otherwise 
(provided the firm can appropriate for itself the learning benefits). See Arrow 
(1962b) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (2014a). 
16. We will qualify this point later, showing that for some kinds of kuowledge, firms 
are able to appropriate returns even without government action, i.e. without 
patents. 
17. In the technical jargon, a public good faces a problem of excludability and non-
rivalrous consumption (Samuelson, 1954). The notion of knowledge as a public 
good is discussed in Stiglitz (1987a), and the notion that lmowledge is a global 
public good is discussed in Stiglitz (1995, 1999) . 
18. Jeremy Bentham (1839, p. 71) put the argument for patents forcefully: 
[T]hat which one man has invented, all the world can imitate. Without the assistance of 
the laws, the inventor would almost always be driven out of the market by his rival, who 
finding himself, without any expense, in possession of a discovery which has cost the 
inventor much time and expense, would be able to deprive him of all his deserved 
advantages, by selling at a lower price. 
19. Some of the reasons for this are discussed below. One is that to obtain a patent, 
one is supposed to disclose information, information which itself might be 
valuable to rivals. Another is that in some sectors much relevant information is 
"tacit," not easily described in a patent application. 
20. Stiglitz (2013c) shows that even if a stronger ("tighter'') intellectual property 
regime resulted in a higher incentive to innovate, given the set of technological 
opportunities (the "knowledge pool"), a stronger intellectual property regime may 
result in a diminished technological pool, so that the overall level of innovation is 
diminished. 
21. See for example the discussion in Henry and Stiglitz (2010). The far-reaching 
America Invents Act of 2011, which comes into force in March 2013, has 
significantly de-emphasized the need for disclosure in order to enforce patents. 
The law and related documents may be viewed at <http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
issues/issues_patentreformact2011.html> (accessed on 8 January 2013) . 
22. See, for instance, Shapiro, 2001. 
23. This section relies heavily on Stiglitz, 2012. 
24. See, for instance, Shapiro, 2010. 
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25. In a perfectly functioning system, presumably there would be a deal between the 
patent holder and the new entrant that would avoid this wasteful expenditure, and 
make both parties better off. With imperfect information, the patent holder may 
not be able to tell who -will be successful at circumventing his patent. He can't 
make such a deal with every possible claimant. 
26. The smarthphone litigation between Samsung and Apple has exemplified the 
problems. See Graham and Vishnubhakat, 2013. 
27. This is not true of some of the more recent theoretical work, including that 
focusing on weak patents, holdups and so on: cf. also the references above. 
28. That is why holdups can have such an adverse effect on innovation: even a small 
"innovation" that is part of a new product, like a microprocessor, can extract a 
disproportionate share of the rents associated with the entire microprocessor. 
29. See, e.g. the large literature on learning by doing, including Greenwald and Stiglitz 
(2014a), Stiglitz (2013b), Arrow (1962b), Pavitt (1987), Dosi and Nelson (2010) 
and the references cited there. 
30. The suit The Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v. United States Patent and 
Trademark Office et al. provides an example of this variability. In June 2013, the 
Supreme Court ruled in a landmark decision that human genes could not be 
patented, after many contradictory rulings in lower courts, some of which had 
upheld Myriad Genetics' patents on a pair of genes linked to breast and ovarian 
cancer. See Stiglitz (2013d) for a 1nore complete discussion. See also Harhoff, 
Regibeau, and Rockett (2001). For a more extensive discussion of the "law and 
economics" of intellectual property, see Stiglitz (2008); Maskus and Reichman 
(2004); Lewis and Reichman (2005); and Merges and Nelson (1994). 
31. See, for instance, Dasgupta and David (1994). 
32. For instance, because of increased incentives for secrecy, undermining the open-
ness that has traditionally characterized academic settings. 
33. See Farrell and Shapiro (2008). 
34. In the concluding section of this paper, we note some changes in the US that may 
have reduced the adverse consequences of IPR. 
35. In that Bayh-Dole was thus a major departure from the conception advanced by 
the Robert Merton (1973) of the "republic of science." 
36. Though to the extent that universities share some of the royalties with researchers, 
the potential gain in their income may result in universities being able to recruit 
researchers at a lower wage than they otherurise could. We have seen no convin-
cing evidence that this is the case, 
37. For a more extensive discussion of the new regulations, see Coriat, Orsi, and 
Weinstein (2003). Discussion of the 1984 regulation change can be found at 
<http://finra.complinet.com/en/ display/ display _main.html ?rbid=2403&element_ 
id=754&print=l> (accessed 4 April 2013). 
38. Obviously, if there were no way of appropriating returns other than patent 
protection, then in such a world there would be little innovation. Everyone 
would be a free rider. But we have emphasized that a model in which it is assumed 
that knowledge disseminates perfectly in the absence of patents is wrong-and so 
even in the absence of patent protection there will be innovation. The question is 
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from this base level, given the adverse effects that we have noted. Advocates of 
stronger intellectual property rights have never demonstrated that this is the case. 
39. Defenders of IPR would, of course, claim that this is not a good test: technological 
opportunities may have been diminished, and in the absence of strong IPR, NCE 
would have fallen even more. But the remarkable advances in basic science would 
seem to suggest a rapid expansion of technological opportunities. The patent 
system itself may be part of the explanation of the diminution in technological 
opportunities. See Stiglitz 2013c. 
40. The adverse effects of patents on genes were noted in the Myriad litigation 
mentioned above. See Huang and Murray, 2008, and Williams, 2013. 
41. That is to say via capital and intermediate inputs embodied innovation that some 
sectors acquire from others. So, for example, the textile industry undertakes very 
little innovation of its own but undergoes a good deal of technical progress via the 
acquisition of new machinery and new fibers introduced elsewhere in the system. 
42. The emerging capability-based theory of the firm (cf. Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Dosi, Nelson and Winter, 2000, and Helfat et al. 
(2007); among many distinguished others, and the survey in Dosi, Failla and 
Marengo, 2008) identifies a fundamental source of differentiation across firms in 
their distinct problem-solving knowledge, yielding different abilities of "doing 
things" -searching, developing new products, manufacturing, etc. Successful cor-
porations derive competitive strength from their above-average performance in a 
small number of capability clusters where they can sustain leadership. Symmet-
rically, laggard firms often find it hard to imitate perceived best-practice produc-
tion technologies because of the difficulty of identifying the combination of 
routines and organizational traits that makes company x good at doing z. Such 
barriers to learning and ilnitation relate to collective practices which in every 
organization guide innovative search, production and other corporate activities 
(more on all that in Chapter 16 of this book by Burlamaqui and Cimoli, and Dosi 
and Nelson, 2010. See also Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2014a). A critical difference 
among firms is thus their capabilities in learning (see Stiglitz, 1987b). 
43. As we have already noted, in the context of developing countries, increased drug 
prices resulting from reduced access to generics means that other social objectives 
(including those associated with health) and spending on development projects 
are constrained. It is not just a matter of consumption. 
44. An archetypical case to the point is the Myriad gene patent: the "innovation" 
would have occurred even had Myriad not done its research-the gene would have 
been discovered just a little later as part of the IPR-free Human Genome Project. 
45. This section draws upon Stiglitz (2013a). 
46. The government could (and does) undertal<:e other roles in a country's innovation 
system besides funding (and in so1ne cases, undertaking) basic research. In 
agriculture, its extension services have played an important role in the dissemin-
ation of knowledge, and some have proposed that government undertake similar 
roles in manufacturing. In pharmaceuticals, it has been argued that government 
could, and should, tal<:e a more active role in testing. (See Jayadev and Stiglitz, 
2009, 2010 and the Conclusion to this volume). Moreover, in most countries 
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governments implicitly or explicitly undertake various arrays of industrial policies 52. The evid 
which deeply influence the rates and directions of innovative activities (more in because 
Cirnoli, Dosi, and Stiglitz, 2009). Stiglitz (I 
47. And some of the so-called research money is really money spent on marketing: the ior and a 
manner in which drugs are tested is not necessarily designed to minimize cost, but in a ris1 
to enhance drug sales after the drug is approved. markets 
48. There are other ways by which innovation can be spurred in this instance. Just like even wh~ 
the granting of patent can be viewed as a prize, but an inefficient one, so too can 53. They are 
the guarantee purchase fund advocated by some for promoting innovation for research 
1nedicines for diseases endemic to developing countries be viewed as a prize. In effective 
this approach, the World Bank or the Gates Foundation would guarantee one or holdup i 
two billion dollars to the person or people who develop a vaccine or cure for AIDS, marketd 
malaria, or some other disease afflicting the developing world for the purchase of demand 
the drug. In effect, there would be a certain market. A sufficiently large guarantee 54. Data fror 
would provide a clear motivation for research. These guaranteed purchase funds, profile o· 
however, would still maintain the inefficiency of the monopoly patent system, profile/cc 
unless there was an accompanying commitment that would make the patent 55. In fact, t 
accessible to all at reasonable royalties for purchases beyond the guarantee. non-mor 
With the guarantee fund the discoverer still receives his "prize" -the monopoly data) wit 
profits-by charging monopoly prices. The poor, who get the drugs through the capita in 
guaranteed purchase fund do not, of course, pay the monopoly price. But the Manyl01 
funds are limited and when they are used up, without such a commitment, a them it 
government that wants to provide to its citizens, say, the malaria medicine that has knowled1 
been bought through the guarantee purchase fund, will have to pay the full are more 
monopoly price. Money spent purchasing this drug at the monopoly price is many an 
money that cannot be spent on the country's other health needs. It may be far 56. For a fu1 
better to use the money for the guarantee purchase fund in a way which spurs discussio 
competition in the provision of the drug, to offer a prize, or to buy the patent, and 57. eBay Inc, 
to allow anyone willing to pay a limited licensing fee to produce it. found at 
49. There may be less to this distinction than meets the eye. Within companies, there on 15 Ja1 
is a research board that has to approve projects, allocating funds among alterna- 58. Stiglitz (: 
tives. Even individual entrepreneurs seeking funds for research turn to a bank, and declaring 
any large project will have to be vetted by the bank. In short, research funds are Compon 
never allocated by an auction mechanism; there is almost always some review Trade Cc 
board. In our diverse society, any project may be reviewed by multiple boards-
there are multiple foundations to which a university research can turn, and 
an entrepreneur can turn to multiple corporations. Thus, in practice, decision-
making involves a mixture of hierarchical (committee) and polyarchical decision-
making structures. (See Sah and Stiglitz, 1985, 1986, 1988). A key distinction, 
however, is who bears the losses and who reaps the gains. Angell, M. (2 
50. This seems to be one of the arguments that Mill used in favor of patents, arguing What to D 
that it avoided "discretion." See John Stuart Mill (1862), as cited in Mennell Arora, A., A. 
(1999). Innovation 
51. See the observation made earlier comparing expenditures on lawyers and on Arrow K. (19 
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52. The evidence is that capital markets do not fully spread risks faced by firms, 
because of massively imperfect information. See for example Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (1990) who discuss the effect of information imperfections on firm behav-
ior and argue that informational problems in the capital market cause firms to act 
in a risk-averse manner. There is also considerable empirical evidence that 
markets do not efficiently distribute risk, i.e., firms act in a risk-averse manner, 
even when risks are uncorrelated with the market. See, e.g., Stiglitz, 1982. 
53. They are distorted, as we have noted, because there are incentives to engage in 
research to innovate around a patent and to spend money in ways that extend the 
effective life of the patent. They are distorted too by the incentives provided for 
holdup innovations. These innovation distortions are in addition to the other 
market distortions, such as those associated with expenditures attempting to malce 
demand curves less elastic. 
54. Data from the World Intellectual Property Organizations online statistical country 
profile of China, available at <http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/country_ 
profile/countries/en.html> (accessed 14 January 2013). 
55. In fact, the relationship between observed IPR regimes and income seems to be 
non-monotonic (though one should not make inferences about causality from the 
data) with a U-shaped relationship between the tightness of IPR regimes and per 
capita incomes (Maskus, 2000; Murmann, 2003; and Chapter 2 in this volume). 
Many low-income countries seem to have high levels of IPR-perhaps because for 
them it doesn't matter as they don't even have the capabilities of borrowing 
knowledge from others. (Alternatively, it may be because these poorer countries 
are more subject to pressure from the advanced industrial countries, e.g. because 
many are very aid dependent and are dependent on discretionary trade benefits.) 
56. For a further critique of TRIPS, see Charlton and Stiglitz, 2005. For a broader 
discussion, see UNCTAD-ICTSD (2005). 
57. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), case documents can be 
fuund at <http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-130.pdf> (accessed 
on 15 January 2013). 
58. Stiglitz (2012). The ITC eventually ruled in favor of Intel in February, 2013, by 
declaring the patents either invalid or not infringed. Matter of Microprocessors, 
Components Thereof, and Products Containing Same, 337-781, U.S. International 
Trade Commission. 
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